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Abstract
In healthcare sector, the move towards Electronic Health Records (EHR) systems has
been accelerating in parallel with the increased adoption of IoT and smart devices.
This is driven by the anticipated advantages for patients and healthcare providers. The
integration of EHR and IoT makes it highly heterogenous in terms of devices, network
standard, platforms, types data, connectivity, etc. Additionally, it introduces security,
patient and data privacy, and trust challenges. To address such challenges, this thesis
proposes an architecture that combines biometric-based blockchain technology with
the EHR system. More specifically, this thesis describes a mechanism that uses
patient’s fingerprint for recovery of patient’s access control on their EHRs securely
without compromising their privacy and identity. A secure distributed healthcare
system (SDHCARE) is proposed to uniquely identify patients, enable them to control
access to, and ensure recoverable access to their EHRs that are exchanged and
synchronized between distributed healthcare providers. The system takes into account
the security and privacy requirements of Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) compliance, and it overcomes the challenges of using
secret keys as patient’s identity to control access to EHRs. The system used distributed
architecture with two layers being local to each healthcare provider that is member of
SDHCARE, and two layers shared across all members of SDCHARE system.
SDHCARE system was prototyped and implemented in order to validate its functional
requirements, security requirements and to evaluate its performance. The results
indicated successful fulfillment of design requirements without significant overhead
on the performance as required by healthcare environments.
Keywords: Blockchain, Healthcare, EHR, Fingerprint, Biometric, Access Control.
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)Title and Abstract (in Arabic

ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺮﻋﺎﯾﺔ اﻟﺼﺤﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻮزع اﻵﻣﻦ
اﻟﻤﻠﺨﺺ

ﻓ ﻲ ﻗﻄ ﺎع اﻟﺮ ﻋ ﺎ ﯾﺔ اﻟ ﺼ ﺤ ﯿﺔ  ،ﻛ ﺎن اﻟﺘﺤ ﺮ ك ﻧﺤ ﻮ أﻧﻈ ﻤ ﺔ ا ﻟ ﺴ ﺠ ﻼ ت ا ﻟ ﺼ ﺤ ﯿ ﺔ ا ﻹ ﻟ ﻜ ﺘ ﺮ و ﻧ ﯿ ﺔ
) (EHRﯾﺘﺴﺎرع ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻮازي ﻣﻊ زﯾﺎدة اﻋﺘﻤﺎد إﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ اﻷﺷﯿﺎء واﻷﺟﮭﺰة اﻟﺬﻛﯿﺔ ،و ھﺬا ﻣﺪﻓﻮع ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺰاﯾﺎ
ا ﻟ ﻤ ﺘ ﻮ ﻗ ﻌ ﺔ ﻟ ﻠ ﻤ ﺮ ﺿ ﻰ و ﻣ ﻘ ﺪ ﻣ ﻲ ا ﻟ ﺮ ﻋ ﺎ ﯾ ﺔ ا ﻟ ﺼ ﺤ ﯿ ﺔ  ،و ﻋ ﻠﻰ ا ﻟ ﺮ ﻏ ﻢ ﻣ ﻦ ا ﻟ ﻤ ﺰ ا ﯾ ﺎ ا ﻟ ﻤ ﺮ ﺟ ﻮ ة ﻓ ﺈ ن د ﻣ ﺞ ا ﻟ ﺴ ﺠ ﻼ ت
اﻟﺼ ﺤ ﯿﺔ اﻹ ﻟﻜ ﺘﺮ و ﻧﯿﺔ ﻣ ﻊ إﻧﺘﺮ ﻧﺖ اﻷ ﺷ ﯿ ﺎء ﯾﺠ ﻌ ﻠﮭ ﺎ ﻏ ﯿﺮ ﻣ ﺘﺠ ﺎﻧﺴ ﺔ ﻟﻠﻐ ﺎﯾﺔ ﻣ ﻦ ﺣ ﯿ ﺚ اﻷ ﺟ ﮭ ﺰ ة ،و ﻣ ﻌ ﯿ ﺎر
ا ﻟ ﺸ ﺒ ﻜ ﺔ  ،و ا ﻷ ﻧ ﻈ ﻤ ﺔ ا ﻷ ﺳ ﺎ ﺳ ﯿ ﺔ  ،و أ ﻧ ﻮ ا ع ا ﻟ ﺒ ﯿ ﺎ ﻧ ﺎ ت  ،و ا ﻻ ﺗ ﺼ ﺎ ل  ،و ﻣ ﺎ إ ﻟ ﻰ ذ ﻟ ﻚ  ،إ ﺿ ﺎﻓ ﺔ إ ﻟ ﻰ ﺧ ﺼ ﻮ ﺻ ﯿ ﺔ
اﻟﻤ ﺮ ﯾﺾ و اﻟﺒﯿ ﺎﻧ ﺎ ت  ،و ﺗﺤ ﺪ ﯾ ﺎ ت اﻟﺜﻘﺔ  ،و ﻟﻤ ﻮ اﺟ ﮭ ﺔ ھ ﺬ ه اﻟﺘﺤ ﺪ ﯾ ﺎ ت  ،ﺗﻘﺘﺮ ح ھ ﺬ ه اﻷ ط ﺮ و ﺣ ﺔ ﺑﻨﯿﺔ ﺗﺠ ﻤ ﻊ
ﺑﯿﻦ ﺗﻘﻨﯿﺔ اﻟﺒﻠﻮﻛﺘﺸﯿﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻨﺪة إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﻘﺎﯾﯿﺲ اﻟﺤﯿﻮﯾﺔ وﻧﻈﺎم  .EHRﺗﺤﺪﯾﺪًا ،ﺗﺼﻒ ھﺬه اﻷطﺮوﺣﺔ
آﻟﯿﺔ ﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﺑﺼﻤﺔ اﻟﻤﺮﯾﺾ ﻻﺳﺘﻌﺎدة اﻟﺘﺤﻜﻢ ﻓﻲ ﺳﺠﻼﺗﮫ اﻟﺼﺤﯿﺔ اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ  EHRﺑﺄﻣﺎن و دون
اﻟﻤﺴﺎس ﺑﺨﺼﻮﺻﯿﺘﮫ وھﻮﯾﺘﮫ ،ﺣﯿﺚ ﯾﻘﺘﺮح ﻧﻈﺎم رﻋﺎﯾﺔ ﺻﺤﯿﺔ ﻣﻮزع آﻣﻦ ) (SDHCAREﻟﺘﺤﺪﯾﺪ
ا ﻟ ﻤ ﺮ ﺿ ﻰ ﺑ ﺸ ﻜ ﻞ ﻓ ﺮ ﯾ ﺪ  ،و ﺗ ﻤ ﻜ ﯿ ﻨ ﮭ ﻢ ﻣ ﻦ ا ﻟ ﺘ ﺤ ﻜ ﻢ ﻓ ﻲ ا ﻟ ﻮ ﺻ ﻮ ل إ ﻟ ﻰ ﺳ ﺠ ﻼ ﺗ ﮭ ﻢ اﻟ ﺼ ﺤ ﯿ ﺔ  ،و ﺿ ﻤ ﺎن اﻟ ﻮ ﺻ ﻮ ل
اﻟﻘ ﺎﺑ ﻞ ﻟﻼ ﺳ ﺘﺮ د اد إﻟﻰ اﻟﺴ ﺠ ﻼ ت اﻟﺼ ﺤ ﯿﺔ اﻹ ﻟﻜ ﺘﺮ و ﻧﯿﺔ اﻟﺨ ﺎﺻ ﺔ ﺑﮭ ﻢ اﻟﺘ ﻲ ﯾﺘﻢ ﺗﺒ ﺎ د ﻟﮭ ﺎ و ﻣ ﺰ اﻣ ﻨﺘﮭ ﺎ ﺑﯿﻦ
ﻣ ﻘ ﺪ ﻣ ﻲ اﻟﺮ ﻋ ﺎﯾﺔ اﻟﺼ ﺤ ﯿﺔ اﻟﻤ ﻮ ز ﻋ ﺔ  ،و ﯾ ﺄﺧ ﺬ اﻟﻨﻈ ﺎم ﻓ ﻲ اﻻ ﻋ ﺘ ﺒ ﺎر ﻣ ﺘﻄ ﻠﺒ ﺎ ت اﻷ ﻣ ﺎن و اﻟﺨ ﺼ ﻮ ﺻ ﯿ ﺔ
ﻟﻼﻣﺘﺜﺎل ﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ﻗﺎﺑﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﻣﯿﻦ اﻟﺼﺤﻲ واﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ ) ،(HIPAAوﯾﺘﻐﻠﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺤﺪﯾﺎت اﺳﺘﺨﺪام
اﻟﻤ ﻔ ﺎﺗﯿﺢ اﻟﺴ ﺮ ﯾﺔ ﻛ ﮭ ﻮ ﯾﺔ اﻟﻤ ﺮ ﯾﺾ ﻟﻠﺘﺤ ﻜ ﻢ ﻓ ﻲ اﻟﻮ ﺻ ﻮ ل إﻟﻰ اﻟﺴ ﺠ ﻼ ت اﻟﺼ ﺤ ﯿﺔ اﻹ ﻟﻜ ﺘﺮ و ﻧﯿﺔ  .و ﯾﺴ ﺘﺨ ﺪ م
اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺑﻨﯿﺔ ﻣﻮزﻋﺔ ﻣﻊ طﺒﻘﺘﯿﻦ ﻣﺤﻠﯿﺘﯿﻦ ﻟﻜﻞ ﻣﻘﺪم رﻋﺎﯾﺔ ﺻﺤﯿﺔ ﻋﻀﻮ ﻓﻲ  ،SDHCAREوطﺒﻘﺘﯿﻦ
ﻣﺸﺘﺮﻛﺘﯿﻦ ﻋﺒﺮ ﺟﻤﯿﻊ أﻋﻀﺎء ﻧﻈﺎم  ،SDCHAREﺣﯿﺚ ﺗﻢ ﺗﺼﻤﯿﻢ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم وﺗﻄﺒﯿﻘﮫ ﻣﻦ أﺟﻞ اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻖ
ﻣ ﻦ ﻣ ﺘﻄ ﻠﺒ ﺎﺗﮫ اﻟﻮ ظ ﯿﻔﯿﺔ و ﻣ ﺘﻄ ﻠﺒ ﺎ ت اﻷ ﻣ ﺎن و ﺗﻘﯿﯿﻢ أد اﺋﮫ  ،و أﺷ ﺎر ت اﻟﻨﺘ ﺎﺋﺞ إﻟ ﻰ ﺗﺤ ﻘ ﯿﻖ ﻣ ﺘﻄ ﻠﺒ ﺎ ت اﻟﺘ ﺼ ﻤ ﯿﻢ
ﺑ ﻨ ﺠ ﺎ ح د و ن أ ﻋ ﺒ ﺎء ﻛ ﺒ ﯿ ﺮ ة ﻋ ﻠ ﻰ ا ﻷ د اء ﻛ ﻤ ﺎ ھ ﻮ ﻣ ﻄ ﻠ ﻮ ب ﻓ ﻲ ﺑ ﯿ ﺌ ﺎ ت ا ﻟ ﺮ ﻋ ﺎ ﯾ ﺔ ا ﻟ ﺼ ﺤ ﯿ ﺔ .
ﻣﻔﺎھﯿﻢ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﺮﺋﯿﺴﯿﺔ :اﻟﺒﻠﻮﻛﺘﺸﯿﻦ ،واﻟﺮﻋﺎﯾﺔ اﻟﺼﺤﯿﺔ ،EHR ،ﺑﺼﻤﺎت اﻷﺻﺎﺑﻊ ،اﻟﺒﯿﻮﻣﺘﺮﯾﺔ،
اﻟﺘﺤ ﻜ ﻢ ﻓ ﻲ اﻟﻮ ﺻ ﻮ ل .
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview
In the healthcare sector, the move towards electronic health record (EHR)
systems has been accelerating in parallel with the increased adoption of IoT and smart
devices. This is driven by the anticipated advantages for patients and healthcare
providers. The Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) for Health Information
Technology within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [1], defined
EHR as “a digital version of a patient’s paper chart. EHRs are real-time, patientcentered records that make information available instantly and securely to authorized
users. While an EHR does contain the medical and treatment histories of patients, an
EHR system is built to go beyond standard clinical data collected in a provider’s office
and can be inclusive of a broader view of a patient’s care. They are built to share
information with other health care providers, such as laboratories and specialists, so
they contain information from all the clinicians involved in the patient’s care".

Some advantages of EHR systems as indicated by ONC [1] are:
•

They maintain and synchronize patients’ medical history, diagnoses, medications,
treatment plans, immunization dates, allergies, radiology images, and laboratory
and test results

•

They allow access to evidence-based tools that providers can use to make decisions
about patients’ care

•

They automate and streamline provider workflow
In 2009, the U.S. government passed the Health Information Technology for

Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act) to motivate the adoption and
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meaningful use of EHR systems. Additionally, they included this objective in the
Federal Health IT Strategic Plan [2]. Figure 1 represents the progress of EHR system
adoption in the United States since 2001.

Figure 1: Percentage of EHR Systems Adoption in US

In parallel with the move towards EHR healthcare systems, Blockchain
technology was introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2009 [3]. Blockchain technology
has received significant attention from the research community. Blockchain’s
decentralized nature along with its cryptographic services increased its potential to be
the future platform for distributed systems. The initial phase of Blockchain technology
was limited to the financial sector and mainly focused on cryptocurrency such as
Bitcoin, which has evolved to become the most popular cryptocurrency application.
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Over time, Blockchain technology has evolved with the introduction of
Ethereum and its smart contracts capability Buterin [4], which provides the
programmability component of Ethereum Blockchain. This step gave Blockchain
technology huge potential and expanded its scope from the financial to other sectors,
including healthcare, education, government, and manufacturing. In particular, for the
healthcare sector and EHR systems, Blockchain technology offers many capabilities
that can fulfill several EHR requirements, as described by McGhin, Choo, Liu, and He
[5], and summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary of EHR Requirements and Blockchain Opportunities
EHR Requirements

Blockchain Opportunities

System
security,
including
authentication, integrity, access control,
and non-repudiation for multiparty
integrated EHR systems

Security, assurance, and immutability
are provided using cryptography,
namely private and public keys
combined with hash-chaining between
blocks of data

Interoperability between different EHR
standards implemented by various
healthcare providers, research entities,
insurance providers, and pharmacies

Smart contracts capability provides an
abstraction
layer
to
enable
communication among miners in
distributed healthcare providers running
different EHR standards

Data sharing of health records

The decentralized architecture allows
multiple entities to share health records

Mobility of healthcare systems with the Shared data across distributed ledgers
introduction of IoT and smart devices enables near real-time updates across the
that allow patients to share and access network to all parties
their health records
Availability of the healthcare system

The
technology
provides
high
availability and resilience through its
decentralized model of operation

4
The close convergence between EHR requirements and Blockchain
capabilities listed in Table 1 is a key driver that has led many proposals to include
Blockchain-based EHR applications, including EHR monitoring and auditing,
mobility applications, and exchange of information.
Despite the promising convergence between Blockchain and EHR systems,
some limitations have been identified regarding the integration between Blockchain
and EHR systems, specifically:
•

Key management in current implementations of Blockchain are based
on private/public key pairs. In Blockchain-based EHR systems, patients
that use their private keys as their identities to control access to and to
sign their EHRs are subject to permanent loss of access to their records
in the case of lost private keys, as discussed in McGhin [5]. This is
because, in asymmetric cryptography, a private key is not recoverable
from the public key (computationally infeasible).

•

The lack of standardization for various deployments of Blockchain in
healthcare systems generates a challenge regarding the interoperability
and exchange of EHRs, which limits the success of deployments [5].

•

There is the potential for privacy leakage due to the unencrypted nature
of blocks that hold information related to patients’ health. Even with
encrypted blocks, the ability to access the blocks publicly, in public
ledgers, makes them subject to cryptanalysis attacks, which can exploit
patients’ privacy if the encryption algorithms are compromised [5].

•

Scalability and IoT overhead can occur due to the increased number of
medical IoT devices and medical sensors joining the Blockchain

5
network. The more IoT devices joining the Blockchain network, the
more the computational complexity of the ledger, which leads to the
need for more computational power on these IoT devices. However,
these IoT devices have very limited computational capabilities and are
not designed to support the complex operations required by Blockchain
hashing algorithms [5].
•

Blockchain entails security vulnerabilities, which are discussed in
detail in Section 1.5.2.

Accordingly, the scope of the present thesis focuses on investigating solutions
to overcome the privacy leakage and key recovery challenges. Specifically, the focus
is on finding a solution that enables blockchain-based synchronization and exchange
of EHRs between distributed healthcare providers while:
•

Ensuring recoverable access to patients’ EHRs

•

Maintaining the unique patients’ identities in EHRs

•

Controlling access to EHRs

•

Providing anonymity to patients’ EHRs in the datastores

•

Detecting any modifications to EHRs, and

•

Logging any activities on EHRs.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
There are several limitations when deploying Blockchain technology in the
healthcare industry, as detailed in Section 1.1. The problem statement targeted by this
research is patients’ inability to recover access to their EHR records in the case of
missing patient identities. This can occur in many cases such as lost private keys or
emergency access to EHRs by unauthorized healthcare providers.
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1.3 Research Objectives
The core objective of this research project is to propose an EHR exchange and
synchronization system based on Blockchain that can provide patients with an access
recovery mechanism to their EHRs. In addition to this objective, the proposed system
fulfills the requirements of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA Act). These legislative requirements include the authentication of access to
EHRs, maintenance of EHR isolation and privacy for each patient, guaranteed integrity
of EHRs, governance of access control to EHRs, and guaranteed audit logs for
patient’s EHRs.
1.4 Research Methodology
This section describes the methodology followed to conduct the research
project. The methodology was structured in a logical order to enable gaining in-depth
knowledge about the research topic, and divided into several phases:
•

A literature review to understand the status of current research on
Blockchain-based EHR systems and identify areas for research.

•

Verification of the uniqueness of the proposal to address the issues
presented in the statement of the problem.

•

Development of high-level design architecture of the proposed solution
followed by a low-level design.

•

A prototype of the proposed design, using Python and Ethereum, to
simulate the functional and security requirements.

•

Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed solution from
functional and security perspectives.
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Google Scholar was used to search several bibliographic databases for
literature related to the current state of research on blockchain in healthcare. The search
string deployed was:
Blockchain AND (Healthcare OR EHR) AND (source: ieee OR source: springer OR
source: acm OR source: sage OR source: Elsevier).
The output from Google Scholar identified 3,390 papers, of which 3,210 papers
were published since 2015.
Initially, only review papers were considered to obtain an overall
understanding of current research. Only top five cited papers were considered for the
literature review. These papers were obtained using the UAEU E-Library, which
provides access to the selected databases used in the Google Scholar filter.
From the initial results, the identified papers were classified into three main
categories:
•

Blockchain core technology – Top five cited papers

•

Blockchain security – Top five cited papers

•

Blockchain in healthcare – Top 10 cited papers

From this review, limitations in the existing blockchain-based EHR proposals
were identified, forming the scope of research for the present thesis.
Google Scholar was consulted again to identify literature related to the use of
biometrics in Blockchain deployment in healthcare. One paper was identified that
details the use of Fuzzy Vault combined with photoplethysmogram (PPG) signals for
key management (see Section 1.5.3).
The next step was to specify the high-level design requirements and
assumptions to build a low-level proposal. The following design requirements were
considered:
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•

Provide a distributed platform to exchange and replicate EHRs

•

Ensure unique patient identity across the platform

•

Ensure unique EHR-to-patient mapping

•

Ensure patient validation to EHR access control requests.

•

Provide an access recovery mechanism for patients’ EHRs

•

Implement audit logging for access requests to EHRs

•

Provide an EHR integrity validation mechanism

•

Provide a mechanism for emergency access to EHRs by non-authorized
providers

•

Ensure the anonymity of EHRs in the datastore across the platform

Additionally, some assumptions were made that were excluded from the design
requirements:
•

All healthcare providers must use the SDHCARE system.

•

All EHRs must be recorded in the same format (e.g., HL7 or FHIR).

•

Secure links are used for communication between healthcare providers,
the Blockchain and the datastore.

Based on the above requirements and assumptions, the low-level design
proposal was developed. More details are provided in Chapter 2.
The next phase was a prototyping phase to build a sample that can implement
the required functional and security features of SDHCARE. The low-level design
blocks were analyzed, and the tools and software required to provide the desired
features and functions for each design block were identified. The final selection of
tools was based on the following criteria:
•

Feature richness and simplicity of the tool.
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•

Security capabilities of the tool.

•

Compatibility and interoperability between the tool and other
components of the SDHCARE system.

The final phase of the research was testing and results analysis. This was
divided into two sections:
•

Validating that design requirements were achieved and can provide the
expected functions.

•

Performance evaluation to measure the average time and speed of
transactions across the SDHCARE system.

The details of system prototyping, implementation, and testing are covered in
Chapters 3 and 4.
1.5 Literature Review
This section covers the literature related to blockchain technology and its
adoption in EHR systems. The reviewed literature covers the progress of research in
the following areas:
•

Blockchain core functionality

•

Blockchain security capabilities and limitations

•

Limitations of legacy centralized EHR systems

•

EHR security, privacy, and compliance requirements

•

Existing proposals for Blockchain-based EHR systems
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Table 2: Summary of the Literature
Category
Blockchain Technology
Blockchain Security

Blockchain in Healthcare

Literature List
Nakamoto [3], Buterin [4], Weber [8], Yaga, Mell,
Roby, and Scarfone [9]
Joshi, Han, and Wang [7], Halpin and Piekarska [10],
Zhong, Zhong, Mi, Zhang, and Xiang [12], Cash and
Bassiouni [13], Tosh et al. [14]
McGhin, Choo, Liu, and He [5], Magyar [15],
Pilkington [16], Zhang, Walker, White, Schmidt, and
Lenz [17], Dagher, Mohler, Milojkovic, and Marella
[18], Azaria, Ekblaw, Vieira, and Lippman [19], Xia,
Sifah, Smahi, Amofa, and Zhang [20], Yang et al.
[21], Roehrs, da Costa, and da Rosa Righi [22], Fan,
Wang, Ren, Li, and Yang [23]

1.5.1 Blockchain Basics
According to the US National Institute of Standardization and Technology
(NIST), Blockchain is defined as:
Distributed digital ledgers of cryptographically signed transactions that are
grouped into blocks. Each block is cryptographically linked to the previous one
(making it tamper evident) after validation and undergoing a consensus
decision. As new blocks are added, older blocks become more difficult to
modify (creating tamper resistance). New blocks are replicated across copies
of the ledger within the network, and any conflicts are resolved automatically
using established rules [6].
The entire blockchain is stored in each miner (as single unit) for
synchronization instead of storing individual blocks. Figure 2 providers an overview
of the structure of the blocks.
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Figure 2: General Chain of Block
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1.5.1.1 Block Components
Joshi, Han, and Wang [7] described the structure of the block as follows.
•

Data: This is the application data held in the distributed blocks. The block
can hold any type of data and is thus application-independent. Further, the
block can hold multiple data units from diverse types of applications. Each
data unit in the block is called a ‘message’ or a ‘transaction’.

•

Hash: In a single block, three types of hash values exist: the hash value of
the previous block (which is used to chain the blocks), the root hash
representing all transactions stored in the block, and the hash value of the
current block at the time it is committed to the chain.

•

Timestamp: The timestamp at which the block was added to the chain.

•

Other information: This includes information such as the software version
used by the miner and the current difficulty level. An essential information
element called a ‘nonce’ is used for block validation and the consensus
algorithm. Figure 3 depicts this structure.
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Figure 3: Block Structure

1.5.1.2 Types of Blockchains
Types of blockchains are defined according to how miners join the Blockchain
network. Joshi, Han, and Wang [7] classified Blockchain networks as follows:
•

Public Blockchain (permissionless): This type of Blockchain is publicly
accessible without permissions or restrictions, eliminating the limitations
of a central authority. Any node running the mining software (such as
GETH for Ethereum Blockchain) can participate and start adding blocks,
executing the consensus algorithm, voting to discard blocks, and obtaining
access to any unencrypted information stored in the blocks.

•

Private Blockchain (permissioned): This type of Blockchain is a
permission-based platform established by a group of firms, individual
firms, or divisions within a firm in which data can be accessed by users that
are part of the mining group and properly authenticated.
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•

Consortium Blockchain: The consortium Blockchain is a hybrid between
the no single trusted entity model of public Blockchain and the single,
highly trustable entity model of private Blockchain. It is perceived as a
partially decentralized Blockchain.

1.5.1.3 Transaction Lifecycle
The lifecycle of transactions varies depending on the type of Blockchain. For
example, in Ethereum, Weber et al. [8] summarized the transaction lifecycle as
follows:
•

The sender prepares its transaction with the application data and sends it to
its local miner. The sender signs the transaction with its private key, which
is validated by the local miner.

•

The local miner generates a transaction ID and broadcasts the ID to the pool
of miners. This transaction ID is a hash value of the hashed transaction.

•

The miners maintain a pool of queued transactions. This queue is generally
sorted based on the fees (called gas) paid by senders to process their
transactions. Miners prefer to pick transactions with higher incentives
(higher gas).

•

Once a miner picks a certain number of queued transactions, it builds a
block to include them. Next, the miner attempts to solve a crypto-puzzle to
be elected to broadcast the block (This is called the consensus algorithm
and varies based on the type of Blockchain. Ethereum uses a proof of work
(POW) algorithm for consensus that is based on solving crypto-puzzles).

•

Upon successful puzzle resolution, the miner posts the block in the
Blockchain and waits for confirmation from other miners on the block that

15
it is committed to the main chain. Ethereum considers the presence of 12
proceeding blocks after the committed block as confirmation.
1.5.1.4 Blockchain Consensus
Yaga, Mell, Roby, and Scarfone [9] described consensus as the process that
determines which user publishes the next block. Different models of consensus are
used in Blockchains. These vary between CPU-intensive models, which is suitable for
permissionless Blockchains for additional security, and low CPU models, which is
suitable for permissioned Blockchains that assume a level of trust between miners.
Some commonly-used consensus models are listed by [9]. The following sections
describe the different models used in Blockchain for reaching consensus.
1.5.1.4.1 Proof of Work (POW)
In the POW model, a complex crypto-puzzle is published to all miners in the
Blockchain. The first miner that solves the puzzle is granted permission to publish its
blocks. The miner has to submit the solved puzzle as a “proof”, which is validated by
other miners, and then the block is accepted. The difficulty of the puzzle varies and is
continuously adjusted to maintain an average block committing time (e.g. 10 minutes
in Bitcoin). Accordingly, POW is considered highly CPU-intensive and is usually used
in permissionless Blockchains to reduce attackers’ interests in participating.
1.5.1.4.2 Proof of Stack (POS)
The POS model uses the amount of stack that miners invest in the system as an
indication of their genuine intention and disinterest in compromising the Blockchain.
The actual stack of the Blockchain varies based on its type, but cryptocurrency is
generally used. The miners invest in the cryptocurrency of the Blockchain, which is
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unusable expect for being a measure of their trust.
This model is currently being evaluated in permissionless Blockchains as it
eliminates the high computational requirements of the POW model.
1.5.1.4.3 Proof of Authority (POA)
The POA model is based on maintaining a level of trust between miners and is
used only in permissioned Blockchains. This level of trust is established through
proven identities, which are verified by Blockchain members (e.g., authorized
documents). During Blockchain runtime, the reputation of miners varies depending on
their behavior, number of accepted blocks, and other factors. Miners with a better
reputation will be awarded more slots to publish blocks while malicious miners will
not be awarded sufficient slots to publish blocks.
1.5.1.4.4 Round Robin Consensus
Similar to the POA model, round robin consensus is limited to permissioned
Blockchains. In this model, miners are awarded equal slots to submit blocks. An
advantage of this model is that it guarantees that no miner can create a majority of
blocks without the need for complex computation for validation.
1.5.2 Blockchain Security
In this section confidentially, integrity and availability (CIA) aspects of
blockchain technology are investigated, as well as some common attacks against
blockchain.
1.5.2.1 Confidentiality
According to NIST [6], confidentiality refers to “preserving authorized
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restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting
personal privacy and proprietary information”. Hence, confidentiality is focused on
authorization and privacy.
NIST [6] defines authorization as “access privileges granted to a user, program,
or process or the act of granting those privileges”, which is not a feature natively
provided by Blockchain technology. Similarly, privacy is not a native feature of
Blockchain. Current implementations of Blockchain technology do not have the
capability of encrypting the contents of the blocks or transactions before committing
them to the ledger. The lack of authorization and privacy can introduce a substantial
risk of a malicious miner joining the mining pool, obtaining a copy of the blocks and
analyzing/exploiting their vulnerabilities. An example of this is the decentralized
autonomous organization (DOA) attack [10]. DAO was an application developed and
executed in Ethereum blockchain with the purpose of maintaining financial
contributions for blockchain-based applications. It had an identity verification
vulnerability which was exploited in 2016, leading to compromised security and losses
totaling more than US$50 million [11]. Lack of privacy and authorization allowed the
attacker to read DOA blocks and identify the vulnerability.
Zhong, Zhong, Mi, Zhang, and Xiang [12] proposed a new model of privacyprotected Blockchain that encrypts data within an agreed upon time to add privacy
capability to the technology. Cash and Bassiouni [13] proposed a two-tier Blockchain
network that provides permissionless Blockchain at tier-1 with a POW consensus
algorithm and permissioned Blockchain at tier-2 with a POA consensus algorithm. In
this model, tier-2 provides access control to data specific to data owners and the users
with whom they are sharing the data. Nodes from the permissionless tier can be
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members of tier-2, which allows them to pass data and make transactions according to
pre-defined access control contracts.
1.5.2.2 Integrity
NIST [6] defines integrity as “guarding against improper information
modification or destruction and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and
authenticity”. Nakamoto [3] explained how Blockchain technology implements strict
integrity verification to avoid manipulation and tampering of data inside the blocks.
This is implemented at three levels: the transaction, block, and miner level.
•

At the transaction level, each miner verifies the hash value of the received
transactions. Only valid transactions are queued in the block to be published in
the ledger. The miner uses the sender’s public key to verify the received
transaction hash value against the locally calculated value. Thus, this
eliminates spoofing of senders’ public keys.

•

At the block level, the miner uses the hash values of all transactions to calculate
the root hash value that represents all transactions in the block (Bitcoin uses
the Merkle tree while Ethereum uses the Patricia tree). The miner will use the
hash value of the last block in the ledger, the root hash of the queued block,
and the nonce value to calculate the local block hash. This nested hashing
represents the actual chaining of the blocks and ensures blockchain integrity
because tampering in any block will require a change in the hash values of all
proceeding blocks in the ledger. Altering one block and all proceeding blocks
is required before a new block is published in the ledger. Figure 4 below shows
the detection of data tampering at the block level.
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Figure 4: The Effects of Tampering with One Block in the Ledger

•

At the miner level, for each new block, the miner verifies the block hash before
accepting it in the ledger as the new last block. Further, the miner verifies the
order of the new block by comparing the hash reference of the current last block
in the ledger against the value listed in the new block. A block that fails the
integrity check by miners or is placed out of order will be discarded if the
majority of miners vote for the same result (i.e., more than 51% of miners vote
to discard the block).
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The nested hashing within the block and between blocks in the ledger
guarantees the integrity of the data stored in Blockchain and makes it immutable
(irreversible). This capability requires a thorough evaluation of the data policy before
posting it on the Blockchain. If sensitive data such as medical records are encrypted
and stored in the Blockchain and the encryption algorithm is later exploited, there
could be significant exposure of sensitive information that cannot be revoked. Another
example is a DOA attack where the Ethereum community cannot revoke the vulnerable
DOA code without forking the ledger (i.e., discarding all the data inserted after the
vulnerable DOA code).
1.5.2.3 Availability
Availability is defined by NIST [6] as “ensuring timely and reliable access to
and use of information”. Availability is well implemented in Blockchain technology.
The distributed architecture of the Blockchain network and the synchronization of the
entire Blockchain across all miners in the pool provides robust resilience against
single-point-of-failure scenarios. Failure in one or more node(s) does not stop the
Blockchain network from introducing new blocks to the chain and/or serving access
requests to the existing blocks. However, failure could impact the availability of the
applications utilizing Blockchain.
Weber et al. [8] investigated the availability provided by Blockchain from an
applications perspective. The research is focused on how the availability of
Blockchain-based applications is affected by the time required to post a transaction on
Blockchain. Using a sample of transactions from the Ethereum and Bitcoin
Blockchains, Weber et al. found that 61.5% of transactions took more than 3 minutes
to be committed in a Blockchain, while 13.8% of the transactions took more than 4.5
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minutes to be committed. Such variation in time can introduce the unavailability of
client applications.
Additionally, Weber et al. [8] investigated the factors that can influence the
delay to commit transactions. Some of these are common between Ethereum and
Bitcoin while others are unique to each, as indicated in Table 3.

Table 3: Factors for Blockchain Transaction Delay Variation
Ethereum

Bitcoin

Transaction fees paid by the client

✔

✔

Transactions’ order of arrival

✔

✔
✔

Locktimes: indicating that a transaction is invalid
until a certain block sequence number is mined
Network delays

✔

Gas limit (per block)

✔

✔

Weber et al. [8] analyzed the impact of DOS attacks on Ethereum Blockchain
and found that the measures currently implemented by Ethereum that use a gas limit
counter DOS attacks and provide strong availability for smart contract applications.
1.5.2.4 Common Blockchain Attacks
Over time, different techniques have been used to attack active Blockchains,
including Ethereum and Bitcoin. These attacks have targeted the core Blockchain
technology rather than the applications running on the Blockchain (application attacks
are subject to the vulnerabilities in applications). Tosh et al. [14] analyzed attacks on
permissionless Blockchains that utilize POW as their consensus algorithm (the same
attacks apply to permissioned Blockchains with lower risk due to the controlled
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admission of miners). The following section reviews the literature on common attacks
on Blockchain.
1.5.2.4.1 Double-spend Attack
In a double-spend attack, the same cryptocurrency (e.g., bitcoins) for more than
one transaction. A malicious miner spends a certain number of bitcoins, for example,
at block i. Starting from block i, the malicious miner privately mines to extend the
Blockchain as fast as possible without publicizing it. The private chain does not
include the bitcoins spent by the attacker in block i. Once the private chain (malicious)
is longer (i.e., has more mined blocks) than the public chain (genuine), the malicious
miner posts the malicious chain, which appears as a fork. Miners vote to resume the
malicious chain and discard the genuine chain because the malicious chain is longer
(which means that genuine transactions are discarded starting from block i, and the
same bitcoins can be reused for other transactions).
1.5.2.4.2 Selfish Mining Attack
In a selfish mining attack, a pool of malicious miners colludes to mine together
(which increases their hashing power) and distributes the incentives among
themselves. This increases their profitability by enabling them to receive regular
incentives (because they dominate the Blockchain with their hashing power) instead
of receiving random incentives when mining independently. At the same time, it
reduces the profitability of honest miners. Honest miners may prefer to join an honest
pool to increase their mining power compared to a selfish pool, generating higher
incentives. Thus, the pool eventually becomes the major player controlling the
Blockchain, and decentralization no longer holds.
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1.5.2.4.3 Eclipse Attack
An eclipse attack is aimed at isolating Blockchain miners and hijacking their
mining power to form a malicious pool of miners controlled by the attacker. This
malicious pool can be used to generate a fork and commit malicious blocks (i.e.,
overwrite the decentralization of Blockchain). Each miner in the ledger is limited to a
certain number of concurrent, outgoing peers to maintain the peer-to-peer network
(Bitcoin implementation limits each node to eight outgoing connection peers while
Ethereum limits this to 11). In addition, it can accept a certain number of unsolicited
incoming connections to form peers on the node’s public IP (Bitcoin allows up to 117
connections).
Considering Bitcoin, each miner maintains a table of IPs for incoming peers
sending unsolicited requests. The miner selects eight peers from the table to initiate
outgoing connections. The selection of IPs is systematic (not random). An attacker can
rapidly and repeatedly initiate unsolicited connection requests to the victim’s node
from attacker-controlled nodes. The victim’s node populates its table with attackercontrolled miners’ IPs. The attacker continues to overwhelm the victim’s node with
irrelevant information until it restarts. With such effort, there is a high chance that the
victim will have the eight outgoing connections to attacker-controlled nodes after
restarting, which isolates the victim from an honest pool, as indicated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Eclipse Attack

1.5.2.4.4 Block Withholding Attack
In this type of attack, some pool members who have joined to help mining
blocks never publish any blocks, thus decreasing the expected revenue of the pool.
1.5.2.4.5 Block Discarding Attack and Difficulty Raising Attack
Block discarding and difficulty raising attacks rely on the attacker’s hashing
power to mine blocks faster than others in the ledger, which leads to an increase of
complexity, affecting the performance of the Blockchain network [14].
1.5.3 Blockchain in Healthcare
The literature reviewed in this section covers the challenges, capabilities, and
some proposed implementations of blockchain in EHR, specifically:
•

The challenges in integrating existing legacy centralized EHR systems

•

The required capabilities in any blockchain-based EHR systems to be
accepted

•

Proposals for blockchain-based EHR systems, including:
o MedRec
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o BBDS
o OmniPHR
o MedShare
1.5.3.1 Centralized-Based EHR
The move towards Blockchain-based EHR systems to integrate distributed
healthcare providers raises questions about the challenges of integrating current
centralized EHR systems that are distributed among healthcare providers with existing
legacy technology. Magyar [15] listed four challenges in integrating existing
centralized EHR systems:
•

In centralized systems, EHRs are maintained in different formats that suit each
provider’s business model. This requires various interfaces and protocols for
integration, and there is no single protocol accepted across all providers.
Because of this complexity, there is high potential of compromising the
security of EHRs and the privacy of patients across the different utilized
middleware technologies and protocols.

•

The current model of centralized systems provides high central authority to the
dominant health provider of the patient, which complicates the exchange of
health information in the case of unplanned treatment in an emergency
situation and can cause serious results such as fatality because of the lack of
timely access to EHRs.

•

Auditing patients’ history and traceability is a significant concern in centralized
EHR systems as the information passes multiple healthcare providers. This is
especially a concern when institutional incentives influence the history of a
patient’s data
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•

The availability of patient data in integrated, centralized EHR systems is
inconsistent, and the related regulations are unclear. It is subject to the
resilience of each centralized healthcare provider.
An example of integrating centralized EHR systems was a five-year agreement

in 2016 between Google DeepMind and the Royal Free London NHS Foundation
Trust. This integration encountered significant problems, which were summarized by
Pilkington [16]:
•

Lack of transparency and privacy

•

Mismanagement of patients’ data and identities

•

Delayed treatment due to malicious software infections, which caused delayed
service recovery

1.5.3.2 Blockchain-Based EHR Required Capabilities
Zhang, Walker, White, Schmidt, and Lenz [17] conducted research on the
required metric for any blockchain-based EHR system to be accepted. The researchers
identified seven metrics:
1. Entire workflow of the system is HIPAA-compliant
2. Framework supports Turing-complete operations
3. Support for user identification and authentication
4. Support for structural interoperability at minimum
5. Scalability across large populations of healthcare participants
6. Cost-effectiveness
7. Support for patient-centered care model
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1.5.3.2.1 Entire workflow of the system is HIPAA-compliant
For a healthcare solution to be accepted and adopted, it must fulfill the
regulatory requirements of a country’s National Health Authority (NHA). Considering
the HIPAA Act, as an example of health regulation act in the US, Dagher, Mohler,
Milojkovic, and Marella [18] analyzed its requirements and concluded that Title II of
five HIPAA titles is relevant to Blockchain-based EHR. This title comprised the
standards for privacy of individually identifiable health information (privacy rule) and
the security standards for the protection of electronic protected health information
(security rule). Magyar [15] further analyzed HIPAA requirements and concluded that
Blockchain technology can fulfill the HIPAA requirements of secured access, privacy,
lack of centralized government, and cost reduction.
Zhang, Walker, White, Schmidt, and Lenz [17] highlighted precautions that
should be considered when implementing HIPAA-complaint Blockchain-based
solutions. Peng et al. stated, “A core tenet of HIPAA compliance is that Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) must be protected against a confidentiality breach. In
particular, the end-to-end workflow of a healthcare app from entering to processing
then delivering the data must be HIPAA compliant”. This can be achieved in
centralized systems using encryption techniques. However, in Blockchain, encryption
may not be useful because any data stored in the Blockchain is replicated across all the
miners and accessible by any party. Therefore, any breach of the currently used
encryption algorithms makes the EHR information vulnerable, especially data in the
Blockchain that is immutable and cannot be deleted. Accordingly, Zang et al.
recommended storing encrypted metadata of the EHRs in the Blockchain (with a
minimum level of information), which ensures that EHR data is securely stored [17].
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1.5.3.2.2 Framework supports Turing-complete operations
Zhang, Walker, White, Schmidt, and Lenz [17] stated that any Blockchainbased EHR system should be Turing-complete and have programming capabilities to
enable simple integration and interoperability with legacy systems. In addition, it
should have the capability for simple upgrades and feature enhancements. Blockchain
networks built specifically for healthcare applications are not scalable and cannot
fulfill these requirements.
1.5.3.2.3 Support for User Identification and Authentication
In EHR systems, users are classified as patients and healthcare professionals.
As [17] stated that any Blockchain-based EHR system should be able to uniquely
identify and distinguish each user while maintaining their anonymity on the
Blockchain, securely authenticate users, and be capable of recovering user’s
authentication information if it is lost or stolen.
1.5.3.2.4 Support for Structural Interoperability at Minimum
The system should enable the exchange of medical data and interpretation of
received data in its current standards [17], i.e., the system should be able to
communicate with known industry standards such as FHIR and HL7.
1.5.3.2.5 Scalability across Large Populations of Healthcare Participants
This was described in [17] thus: “A successful health app should leverage the
Blockchain to enhance interoperability, while maintaining its quality when users or
components of the app scale up and out”.
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1.5.3.2.6 Cost-effectiveness
Any blockchain-based EHR system should be cost-effective compared to the
existing legacy systems without affecting its capabilities [17]. This factor has a
significant impact on the selection of blockchain parameters, including type, consensus
algorithm and incentives model.
1.5.3.2.7 Support of Patient-centered Care Model
According to [17], any Blockchain-based EHR system should provide patients
with the ability to control or monitor their information without compromising other
functionalities. These features may include self-reporting health information, access
to personal medical records and prescription history from different providers, auditing
existing access to patient health records, and the ability to share or revoke access to
patients’ own medical data.
1.5.3.3 MedRec
MedRec was proposed by Azaria, Ekblaw, Vieira, and Lippman [19] to utilize
Blockchain technology to integrate existing centralized EHR systems among
distributed healthcare providers. The solution uses Ethereum Blockchain’s smart
contracts capability to facilitate this integration. Each healthcare provider should
contribute an Ethereum mining node (usually a dedicated server) to participate in
MedRec. In addition, patients should also contribute an Ethereum mining node (on a
PC or mobile device) to participate in MedRec. The main functions of MedRec are to:
•

Enable inter-provider access to patients’ EHRs using API interfaces. The API
information of the providers is stored in the Blockchain.

•

Provide patients with the capability to manage access control to their EHRs.
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Access control lists for patients and providers are stored in the Blockchain.
•

Detect and notify patients about new access requests to their EHRs. Access
can be granted or rejected only by patients.

•

Notify patients about changes to their EHRs and log the changes in the
Blockchain.

•

Provide a copy of EHRs on patients’ nodes and dominant providers’ nodes.
Although MedRec accelerates the deployment of EHR systems by integrating

with existing systems using Blockchain technology to overcome the major limitations
of centralized EHR systems, MedRec has shortcomings that limit its feasible
production implementation:
•

A mandatory component of MedRec is the presence of patients’ nodes, which
are used to communicate with patients for access control management. This
limits the scope of MedRec solutions to Blockchain-enabled patients (i.e.,
patients should have an Ethereum account). This is a major limitation of the
solution from the patients’ perspective (but not the providers’ perspective).
Any proposed solution should be capable of supporting all patients without
restrictions.

•

Ethereum Blockchain uses POW as its consensus algorithm, which is known
to have significant computing power requirements. While healthcare providers
can contribute powerful mining nodes to use MedRec, this cannot be
(practically) achieved for patients, whose nodes are on PCs or mobile devices,
making MedRec practically infeasible.

•

If a patient loses the private key to their Ethereum account (which is possible
using a mobile device or PC), MedRec does not provide a mechanism for a
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patient to recover control of their EHR.
•

The use of current centralized EHR systems raises an interoperability problem
regarding inter-provider access. The solution must assume that all providers
utilize the same EHR format standard such as HL7 or FHIR [19], which is not
the case with the current centralized systems.

•

MedRec does not provide a mechanism for emergency access to EHRs if a
patient is admitted to a non-authorized hospital for emergency treatment.

1.5.3.4 BBDS
Xia, Sifah, Smahi, Amofa, and Zhang [20] proposed a Blockchain-based data
sharing (BBDS) system to provide access control management to EHRs stored in the
cloud based on the Blockchain technology. The proposed BBDS system utilizes
permissioned Blockchain consisting of an issuer that grants users or organizations
access to the system, a verifier that validates requests from system members and grants
corresponding access rights, and consensus nodes that facilitate the interface between
members and the verifier in addition to logging requests in Blockchain for auditing
and forensics purposes. The BBDS system provides the following functionalities:
•

A proof of verification (POV) algorithm between the issuer and
users/organizations to enroll them in the BBDS system. The POV algorithm
is based on a proposed lightweight Diffie-Helman key exchange to generate a
session key for encryption and an electronic registration form to be validated
by the issuer.

•

Controlled access to EHRs, stored in the cloud, by a verifier node for members
of the BBDS system. This verification process is based on a per-member
private key generated during the registration phase by the issuer and
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communicated to members and the verifier. After successful verification of a
member’s identity, the verifier validates the request against member rights
and, if access is granted, the verifier retrieves data from the cloud and passes
it to the member, or read data from the member and posts it in the cloud.
•

Audit logging in the Blockchain ledger using consensus nodes, where each
member’s request to read or post an EHR is stored in a separate block. The
information recorded in the block includes user identity, purpose of the
request, processing consensus node, verification result, and timestamps,
including request creation, request retrieval from unprocessed requests pool,
verification time, block broadcast time, and data send time.
Although the BBDS system is not limited by cryptography key recovery and

emergency access restrictions (because the actual EHRs are not stored in the
Blockchain and their access is controlled by the issuer/verifier), it has other limitations
with the current implementation:
•

The use of permissioned Blockchain eliminates decentralized authority, which
is a core advantage of Blockchain technology. The model provides central
authority to the issuer (not the patient) to verify and accept members in the
system.

•

Because of the use of non-Turing-complete Blockchain (i.e., no smart
contracts), the BBDS system records each event in a single block to be able to
uniquely identify the events by the block reference. This limits the scalability
of the system because of recording a large number of blocks in a very short
time.

•

The proposed model provides the data to the requester before recording the
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request details in the Blockchain, which introduces a vulnerability in the
system as data is provided without a recorded request.
•

The proposed BBDS system does not have a mechanism to detect
modifications/tampering in EHRs in the cloud caused by system-independent
reasons such as malicious activity in the cloud.

1.5.3.5 MedShare
MedShare was proposed by Yang et al. [21] to connect centralized healthcare
entities and exchange EHRs using a hybrid cloud infrastructure. The proposal was
prototyped with three healthcare entities: Hospital Conde S. Januário (HC), Kiang Wu
Hospital (KW), and Macau University of Science and Technology Hospital (UH).
Medshare functions as follows:
•

Each healthcare entity has a private cloud that converts EHRs from the entity’s
specific format to a standard EHR format and stores them locally in the private
cloud. In other words, each entity has two copies of an EHR, in a standard
format and a non-standard format.

•

Standard format EHRs are indexed using hash maps, and the index values are
stored in a public cloud that is connected with private clouds. The public cloud
has a synchronizer component that is used to replicate per-patient EHRs across
all private clouds (scheduled replication).

•

Doctors locally authenticate with the healthcare entity and query the EHRs of
patients. If a healthcare entity cannot find a patient ID locally (assuming
replication not yet been done), it queries the public cloud to locate the patient’s
EHR and, after successful validation, obtains the EHR.
The Medshare model is very practical and overcomes major limitations in
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legacy EHR systems, but it lacks the following:
•

Neither private nor public clouds guarantee immutable access control rules,
privacy isolation between patients, or immutable integrity verification, which
is provided by Blockchain technology.

•

The replication of EHRs between healthcare entities is not scalable when a
large number of healthcare entities are involved in the system. This requires
! × (! − 1) connections to achieve full replication of EHRs.

•

Medshare uses patients’ ID cards as a mechanism for uniquely identifying
patients and obtaining their consent to grant healthcare providers access rights
to their EHRs, which is known to be an insecure technique compared to
biometrics identity verification.

1.5.3.6 OmniPHR
Roehrs, da Costa, and da Rosa Righi [22] proposed a Blockchain-based
application, OmniPHR, to address the following problems:
•

Provide a unified view to patients of their healthcare records from anywhere
at any time.

•

Provide up-to-date information to healthcare providers about patients
regardless of whether the data is local to the provider or is from an external
provider.

•

Provide a single standard for healthcare records.

Each member of OmniPHR joins the Blockchain through a miner, called a leaf
node. OmniPHR uses a ‘routing overlay’ node (called a super node), which is
responsible for managing leaf nodes and inter-communication with other routing
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overlays. Some other roles of the routing overlay node are:
•

EHR handling: Accepting input medical records from IoT devices or
healthcare organizations, converting them to an open EHR format (the
standard EHR format used by OmniPHR), dividing the EHRs into chunks of
blocks, and distributing the blocks across Blockchain miners using loadbalancing algorithms

•

Security: Encrypting blocks, signing blocks, validating blocks, and providing
access authentication and access control to the blocks.

OmniPHR has limitations in its capability to provide a unified EHR system:
•

Similar to BBDS, the use of non-Turing-complete Blockchain adds significant
complexity for additional features or enhancements to the system compared to
Turing-complete Blockchain, which can have added features through software
coding.

•

Storing large data in the Blockchain (e.g., X-rays and MRI scans) is not
practical due to the size requirements on the nodes, which entails significant
overhead in addition to the encryption and decryption processing overhead.

•

The proposed model does not uniquely identify the author of data because all
the blocks are signed by the leaf nodes or super nodes.

•

Access to EHRs should be authorized by patients, which does not address the
limitation of unplanned treatment such as emergency admission by
unauthorized healthcare providers.

•

OmniPHR does not overcome the limitation of duplicate data such as duplicate
patient registration information that occurs when a patient register at two
healthcare providers with different identities. Ideally, OmniPHR should have
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a mechanism to uniquely identify each patient without duplication, such as
biometric identity.
1.5.3.7 MedBlock
Fan, Wang, Ren, Li, and Yang [23] proposed the MedBlock system to share
medical data efficiently using Blockchain. The MedBlock system generates a
private/public key pair for each patient that is used to encrypt and sign medical records.
The actual records are stored in the health provider’s local database while the
Blockchain holds the hash value of the records. The core functions provided by
MedBlock are:
•

A dedicated certificate authority server is used to generate keypairs for
patients, community hospitals and national hospitals.

•

Patients submit their records through community hospitals or national
hospitals signed with their private key and encrypted by their public
key.

•

Health records are not stored in community hospitals. Instead, they are
stored directly in national hospitals’ databases.

•

The department that accepted records from a patient signs them using
its local private key to ensure integrity and non-repudiation.

•

Each geo-group of national hospitals has the same group of endorsers
that will build the blocks and submit them to the consensus nodes
(called orderers). The hospitals submit the hash value of the medical
records to the endorsers, and the records are stored in the local database.

•

Once the orderers reach consensus, they post the block to the ledger.

•

Access control is implemented by MedBlock through private key
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signatures. The client application scans the blocks until a valid
signature is found that corresponds to the patient’s data.
While MedBlock provides an efficient and scalable mechanism using rolebased nodes to perform specific functions and guarantee security through doublesigning, it has the following drawbacks:
•

The use of private/public keys for patients to sign and encrypt records
creates an issue in the case of unplanned treatment such as emergency
admission. In such a case, medical records will not be accessible, which
can cause complications with treatment and even fatality.

•

If a private key is lost, patients cannot recover their medical records.

•

The access control mechanism used is inefficient, especially when the
ledger grows to a very large number of blocks. In this case, examining
all the blocks until the records are found is not scalable.

•

The lack of programmability is a major drawback of MedBlock if new
features are required, as this would require the addition of new nodes.

•

MedBlock does not provide a mechanism to exchange medical records
between hospitals as the records are stored in the local database of
national hospitals.
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Chapter 2: Methods
This chapter addresses the contribution to the problem statement and proposes
a solution to ensure an access recovery mechanism for patients’ EHRs that are
exchanged and synchronized between distributed healthcare providers using
Blockchain. The high-level architecture of the solution is discussed, followed by a
detailed explanation of individual components and layers. In addition, functional use
cases of the design are provided and explained.
2.1 Design Overview
The approach followed in our solution is to divide the system into layers and
provide distributed functions in a modular structure. Accordingly, the system is
divided into four layers, namely the User Interface, Middleware, Blockchain, and
Cloud Store. Figure 6 shows the layers that comprise SDHCARE and the modules
associated with each layer.
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Layers Local Per-Provider
(a) - User Interface

Admin UI

Doctor UI

Reception UI

External Entity UI

Patient UI

(b) - Middleware

DirectoryService
Middleware Manager
DatabaseService
Blockchain Client

Cloud API Interface

Layers Shared All-Providers
(c) - Blockchain

dnsSC

providersTable

patientsSC

patientsTable

accessControlSC

ehrHashTable

(d) - Cloud

Cloud Store

Figure 6: SDHCARE High-Level Architecture

2.1.1 User Interface (UI) Layer
The UI layer is the presentation of the system to the users, by which they can
interact with SDHCARE. These users can be doctors, pharmacists, receptionists,
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officers, researchers, or insurance companies, among others. This layer is local to each
healthcare provider that is a member of SDHCARE. It has mandatory and customized
components according to a provider’s needs. The mandatory components are
summarized as:
•

Admin UI: This interface is mainly used by authorized representatives
of the healthcare provider to enroll the provider in the SDHCARE
system. Upon successful enrollment, the provider’s details are stored
in a providers’ immutable table for it to be uniquely identified in the
SDHCARE system.

•

Reception UI: This interface is used by a healthcare provider’s
reception department. It provides two main functions:
o Registering new patients in the system, which involves creating
an entry for each patient in an immutable-blockchain table that
includes all patients in SDHCARE. This ensures exchange and
synchronization of all patients across SDHCARE healthcare
providers.
o Booking and confirming patients’ appointments, which grant
the corresponding clinics and/or departments access to patient’s
records (after the patient’s confirmation using his/her
fingerprints). This access is stored and maintained along with
the patient’s registration record.

•

Patient UI: This is a biometric interface that accepts patients’
fingerprints and uses them for the following functions:
o Uniquely identify patients using fingerprints instead of secret
keys (or private keys) across all members of SDHCARE.
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o Managing access and role assignments by patients using
fingerprints, which eliminates the problem of recovering a
patient’s management of access to their records in the case of a
lost secret key
o Indexing patients’ records metadata stored in the blockchain
records table
o Simplify the process of granting access to patient records in the
case of emergency treatment using fingerprints
•

Doctor UI: This interface is used by the doctors to view patients’ EHRs
and post new EHRs after successful validation of a patient’s identity
and authorization rules implemented in the SDHCARE system.

•

External Entity UI: This interface enables remote healthcare providers,
research entities, insurance companies, and other parties to obtain
access to patient records after successful validation of access requests
to provide globalized access to the SDHCARE system.

2.1.2 Middleware Layer
This layer is the core of the SDHCARE solution. It is used to interlink all of
the other SDHCARE layers in addition to providing major SDHCARE services,
including directory services and database services. Figure 6 (b) lists all modules
included in the Middleware layer. These modules are local to each healthcare provider
participating in the SDHCARE system and can be summarized as follows:
•

DirectoryService Module: This module is mainly used to host the
directory of all accounts of the healthcare provider. Local identities
within the healthcare provider (e.g., doctors, nurses, system admins,
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receptionists) are validated against the DirectoryService module.
Additionally, it is responsible for access control validation on UIs.
•

DatabaseService Module: This module is responsible for holding all
database information local to the healthcare provider, including clinics’
IDs, provider registration details, and patients’ appointments.

•

Middleware Manager Module: This module acts as the main controller
for interacting between the modules within Middleware layer as well
as intercommunication with other layers including UI, Blockchain and
Cloud Store layers.

•

Cloud Application Programmable Interface (API) Interface Module:
This module is mainly used to facilitate communication between the
Middleware Manager module and the Cloud Store to read or post
healthcare records.

•

Blockchain Client Module: This module is responsible for the
communication between the healthcare providers and Blockchain layer.
All interactions between the Middleware Manager module and the
Blockchain layer go through this module. Two types of operations exist
within this module:
o Write requests to publish new blockchain transactions of data
to the Blockchain smart contracts and immutable tables.
o Read requests in the form of data transactions consolidated in
blocks to read data from the immutable tables or responses from
smart contracts.
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2.1.3 Blockchain Layer
The Blockchain layer is a shared layer across all healthcare providers
participating in SDHCARE. This layer provides two core functions in the SDHCARE
system, namely:
•

Immutable smart contracts (SC) to perform programmed logic
functions.

•

Immutable tables in the form of chained blocks to store different types
of data that need to be protected against unauthorized tampering.

The design of the immutable tables is distributed to ensure the anonymity of
the data stored in these tables. For example, the visibility of ehrHashTable should not
provide any correlation to the patients in patientsTable. This correlation is controlled
by the middleware layer using patient’s fingerprint hash. Similarly, the design of the
smart contracts is distributed to ensure modularity and flexibility for additional
features and enhancements.
Figure 6 (c) summarizes the components of the Blockchain layer. The next
sections provide details of each component.
2.1.3.1 DNS Smart Contract (dnsSC)
The dnsSC is programmed to perform the initial enrollment of the healthcare
provider in the SDHCARE system. It takes the provider’s information from the Admin
UI and stores it in providersTable. In addition, it ensures the uniqueness of the
provider’s information across all the members of the SDHCARE system.
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2.1.3.2 Patients Smart Contract (patientsSC)
This smart contract plays a vital role in the SDHCARE system and is
responsible for multiple functions:
•

Initial registration of patients in the SDHCARE system, which includes
populating patients’ details in patientsTable.

•

Updating ehrHashTable with new EHR metadata and their
corresponding hash values.

•

Retrieving patients’ details from patientsTable.

•

Retrieving the list of EHRs from ehrHashTable.

2.1.3.3 Providers Table (providersTable)
providersTable is an immutable table stored in Blockchain (in the form of
chained blocks) and holds information about all healthcare providers that are members
of SDHCARE. It is populated using dnsSC. Figure 7 outlines the information held in
providersTable:
•

Name: Healthcare provider’s name

•

Web address: Healthcare provider’s domain name

•

OHP: Healthcare provider’s Blockchain address

Figure 7: Summary of providersTable Data
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2.1.3.4 Patients Table (patientsTable)
This immutable table stores information about patients and is populated using
patientsSC. The data in patientsTable is indexed using patients’ fingerprints hashes,
which is critical for the unique identification of patients. In addition, the fingerprints
hashes indicate the relationship between patientsTable and ehrHashTable. Figure 8
summarizes the data stored in this table:
•

Fingerprint Hash: Patient fingerprint hash

•

OHP: This is used to trace the origin of the patient record

•

PACL: This is the patient access control list array and includes the IDs
of clinics allowed to access a patient’s EHR

•

Receptionist ID: The ID of a local’s provider reception department is
used for auditing purposes

Figure 8: Summary of patientsTable Data

2.1.3.5 EHR Metadata Table (ehrHashTable)
The EHR Metadata Table holds the metadata of patients’ EHRs and their
corresponding hash values. These hash values are used for indexing EHR raw data
uploaded to the cloud store. Additionally, these hash values are used for detecting any
unauthorized changes to EHRs. Similar to patientsTable, ehrHashTable is indexed
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using patients’ fingerprints hashes to ensure unique mapping between patients’ EHRs
and their identities.
Our design stores the hash values of the EHRs in ehrHashTable instead of the
EHRs raw data for two reasons:
•

In Blockchain, blocks are not encrypted, accordingly, storing clear-text
EHRs breaches the privacy of patients. Further, storing encrypted
EHRs makes them subject to crypto-analytic attacks, and any success
in cracking the encrypted algorithms would breach patients’ privacy.

•

Blocks are stored locally on the miners. This method can be used for
small EHRs. However, for large EHRs such as MRI scans and X-ray
images, the solution won’t be scalable.

Figure 9 summarizes the information included in ehrHashTable:
•

EHR Name: EHR name

•

EHR Date: EHR creation date

•

EHR Hash: EHR Merkle root hash

•

Fingerprint Hash: Patient fingerprint hash

•

EHR Status: EHR status (active/deleted)

Figure 9: Summary of ehrHashTable Data
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The hash value of the EHR is calculated using a Merkle Tree algorithm as
follow:
H1 = SHA256 (EHR Name) + SHA256 (EHR Raw Data)
H2 = SHA256 (Date) + SHA256 (EHR Status)
Merkle Root Hash = SHA256(SHA256 (H1) + SHA256 (H2))
Finally, the Merkle root hash is used as an indexing key in the cloud store to
look up EHRs raw data.
2.1.3.6 Access Control Smart Contract (accessControlSC)
The accessControlSC acts as access control manager for any activity on
patients’ EHRs. It validates all requests including:
•

Writing EHR records in ehrHashTable.

•

Reading EHR records from ehrHashTable.

•

Granting health provider clinics access to EHRs.

Table 4 summarizes the access control matrix provided by accessControlSC.

Table 4: Access Control Matrix by accessControlSC
providersTable
Reception

Read
Write
Read

Doctor
Patient
Officer

patientsTable

Grant
Read/Write

ehrHashTable

Read
Write
Grant
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2.1.4 Cloud Store Layer
The Cloud Store layer is a shared layer across all healthcare providers
participating in the SDHCARE system. It holds patients’ raw EHRs, which are indexed
using Merkle root hash values of the EHRs. This makes EHRs in the cloud store
completely anonymous. In other words, an EHR cannot be traced back to a patient’s
identity because patient’s identity, fingerprint, is not stored in the cloud store,
blockchain or providers’ DatabaseService modules.
2.2 Functional Use Cases
This section explains SDHCARE operation for major use cases that exist in
any healthcare provider deploying SDHCARE. These use cases include provider
enrollment in SDHCARE, new patient registration, patient appointment management,
and doctors’ access to patients’ EHRs.
2.2.1 SDHCARE Provider Enrollment
For enrollment in the SDHCARE system, a provider should select a unique
name and web address for global reachability. The next step is storing this information
in providersTable. This helps other providers verify the uniqueness of their
information before enrollment in SDHCARE. Further, it is used by all SDHCARE
healthcare providers to identify the source of patient EHRs. The process of provider
enrollment, shown in Figure 10, is summarized as follow:
1. From the Admin UI, the provider’s admin is authenticated against the
provider’s DirectoryService.
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2. After successful authentication, the admin enters the provider’s details
in the Admin UI (name and web address).
3. The provider’s Middleware Manager sends a request to the Blockchain
through its Blockchain Client to create a new account, which entails
generating a keypair. The private key is used to sign all requests
(transactions) from the provider. The public key is used as the
provider’s Blockchain address to uniquely identify it across the ledger
(OHP). This keypair is returned to the provider from the Blockchain
and stored in DatabaseService component of SDHCARE
4. Next, the Middleware Manager obtains the provider’s OHP from the
DatabaseService component and the Blockchain Client calls the dnsSC
to update providersTable with the provider’s name, web address, and
OHP.
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Figure 10: Hospital Enrollment Sequence Diagram

2.2.2 Patient Registration
New patients visiting a SDHCARE-enabled healthcare provider go through the
registration process to be added to patientsTable. Once patients complete the
registration process, they are uniquely identified across all SDHCARE-enabled
providers. This unique identification is achieved using patients’ fingerprints hashes for
patientsTable indexing. The process of adding new patients to the SDHCARE system
is described below and summarized in Figure 11.
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1. The receptionist uses Reception UI to authenticate against a provider’s
DirectoryService.
2. After successful authentication, the receptionist captures the patient’s
details that are required by patientsTable through Reception UI.
3. The patient validates and confirms the details by submitting his/her
fingerprint through Patient UI. A fingerprint is a mandatory input to resume
the process.
4. Next, the provider’s Middleware Manager obtains the provider’s OHP and
the reception ID from the provider’s DatabaseService. This information is
passed to the Blockchain Client.
5. Finally, the provider’s Blockchain Client calls patientsSC to store the
patient’s details entered by the receptionist, along with the provider’s OHP
and reception ID, in patientsTable indexed using the patient’s fingerprint
hash.
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Figure 11: Summary of the Patient Registration Process

2.2.3 Patient Appointment Management
SDHCARE-reception manages patients’ appointments, including booking new
appointments and acknowledging existing appointments attended by patients. The
appointments are stored in each provider’s DatabaseService and are indexed using
patients’ national IDs (NIDs). Additionally, the appointments are not synchronized
between providers in the SDHCARE system. A patient attending an appointment needs
to confirm the attendance by submitting his/her fingerprint. This confirmation grants
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the clinic access to the patient’s EHR. Figure 12 summarizes the process of booking a
new patient appointment, which entails the following steps:
1. The receptionist uses Reception UI to authenticate against the provider’s
DirectoryService.
2. After successful authentication, the receptionist provides appointment
details, including the patient’s name, NID, date/time, and clinic.
3. The Middleware Manager receives the details of the appointment from the
Reception UI and stores them in the DatabaseService of the local provider.

Figure 12: Process for Booking a New Appointment

The process of confirming a patient’s appointment and granting access to the
visited clinic is described below and summarized in Figure 13:
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1. The receptionist uses Reception UI to authenticate against the provider’s
DirectoryService.
2. After successful authentication, the receptionist looks up the patient’s NID
against DatabaseService to obtain a list of the patient’s active
appointments.
3. The receptionist selects the desired appointment and the patient confirms it
by submitting his/her fingerprint using Patient UI.
4. Upon confirmation, the Middleware Manager queries DatabaseService to
obtain the visited clinic’s ID and deactivate the selected appointment.
5. Finally, the Middleware Manager calls accessControlSC through the
Blockchain Client to append the clinic’s ID to the PACL stored in
patientsTable and indexed using the patient’s fingerprint hash. This grants
the visited clinic access to the patient’s EHR.
It is important to note that the Blockchain Client uses the clinic ID + OHP as
the format of the clinic ID stored in PACL. This eliminates the possibility of conflict
caused by providers having the same clinic IDs and being granted access to the same
EHRs. For example, if the clinic ID is 100 and the OHP is 100000000000000000001,
the clinic ID stored in PACL is 100100000000000000000001, which is guaranteed to
be unique due to the uniqueness of the OHP in the Blockchain.

55

Figure 13: Booking Confirmation and Access Granting Summary

2.2.4 Doctor’s EHR Access
In the SDHCARE system, doctors can have read and/or write access to EHRs,
as detailed in Section 2.1.3.6. This access can be granted by patients using their
fingerprints, as described in Section 2.2.3. EHRs are divided into EHRs’ metadata,
which is stored in ehrHashTable and indexed using patients’ fingerprints hashes to
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ensure unique identification, and EHRs’ raw data, which is stored in the cloud store
and indexed using the Merkle root hash of the EHRs. Using read access, doctors can
obtain a list of accessible patients’ EHRs from ehrHashTable and download the desired
one(s) from the cloud store. Write access allows doctors to create new EHR metadata
in ehrHashTable and upload the EHR raw data to the cloud store. The following
summarizes doctors’ EHR read process, which is also outlined in Figure 14.
1. The doctor uses Doctor UI to authenticate against the provider’s
DirectoryService.
2. After successful authentication, Doctor UI is redirected to Patient UI for
the patient to submit their fingerprint.
3. Upon the patient’s submission of their fingerprint, the Middleware
Manager queries the DatabaseService for the doctor’s clinic ID using the
doctor’s username.
4. Next, the Middleware Manager makes a call to accessControlSC through
the Blockchain Client. This call uses the patient’s fingerprint hash and the
doctor’s clinic ID to validate whether the doctor has read access to the
patient’s EHR.
5. If the clinic ID is listed in the PACL of the patient (by reading patientsTable
using the fingerprint hash), accessControlSC grants the doctor read access.
6. Based on the authorized read request, the Blockchain Client calls
patientsSC to find the list of EHRs stored in ehrHashTable. This list is
returned to the Middleware Manager which passes the details to Doctor UI.
The lookup is executed by patientsSC using the patient’s fingerprint hash
passed from the Blockchain Client.
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7. Upon the doctor’s selection of the desired record, the Middleware Manager
initiates a call to the cloud store, through Cloud API Interface, to retrieve
the EHR data (using the Merkle root hash associated with the selected
record in the list).
8. Once the EHR data is received by the Middleware Manager, it performs an
integrity check by comparing the stored Merkle hash of the selected record
against the calculated Merkle hash of the received data.
9. If the hash is valid, the Middleware Manager passes the data back to the
doctor. Otherwise, an integrity failure alert is triggered.
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Figure 14: Summary of the EHR Read Process
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Similar to the read process for EHRs, the process by which doctors write EHRs
by doctors is outlined in Figure 15 and summarized as follows:
1. The doctor uses Doctor UI to authenticate against the provider’s
DirectoryService.
2. After successful authentication, the doctor adds details and/or attach files to the
EHR.
3. The patient verifies the details of the EHR and confirms acceptance by
submitting their fingerprint.
4. Once submitted, the Middleware Manager looks for the doctor’s clinic ID in
DatabaseService using the doctor’s login.
5. Once the clinic ID is returned from DatabaseService, the Middleware Manager
uses the Blockchain Client to call accessControlSC requesting authorization to
write EHR metadata to ehrHashTable. The authorization request submits the
patient’s fingerprint hash and clinic ID to accessControlSC to verify if the
clinic ID is listed in the PACL of the patient.
6. Upon successful authorization, the Middleware Manager calculates the Merkle
root hash of the EHR.
7. Next, the Blockchain Client call patientsSC to write EHR metadata into
ehrHashTable, which includes EHR details and the Merkle root hash. This is
indexed using the patient’s fingerprint hash.
8. Finally, the Middleware Manager uses the Cloud API Interface to upload the
EHR data to the cloud store with the name of the EHR as the Merkle root hash.
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Figure 15: Summary of the EHR Write Process
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Chapter 3: Implementation
This chapter discusses the implementation of the SDHCARE prototype
according to the proposed design functions. The chapter covers the selection process
for the technologies used in the prototype and provides an overview of them. The final
section of this chapter outlines the high-level implementation of the SDHCARE
prototype. The low-level implementation and coding of the SDHCARE prototype are
described in detail in the appendices.
3.1 Prototype Components
This section provides an overview of the components used to build our
prototype. These components were selected based on the following criteria:
•

Simplicity of the component setup and configuration to implement the
required functions in SDHCARE.

•

Interoperability capabilities of the component with other technologies
to simulate the overall design of SDHCARE.

•

Feature richness and built-in security capabilities of the component that
are in line with SDHCARE requirements.

•

Stability, reliability, and operational consistency of the component.

According to the proposed SDHCARE design, which was described in Chapter
2, the following technologies were selected for the prototype:
•

Django 3.0 Web Development Platform: This was used to build the
required web interfaces for Doctor UI, Admin UI, and Reception UI.
Django is a Python-based platform that has built-in directory services.
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This feature allows Django to integrate seamlessly with customized
Python modules to provide additional functions such as API integration
with Ethereum.
•

Python 3.8: The Python interpreter is at the core of the SDHCARE
prototype and provides the following functions:
o Django web development coding language.
o Interaction with Django built-in directory services.
o API integration with the Blockchain and cloud store.
o SQL interface with healthcare provider database.
o Integrity validation and hashing of EHRs.

•

SQLite 3: SQLite was used to implement the DatabaseService module
local to the healthcare provider, mainly for storing information,
including departments’ IDs, appointments, and a provider’s Blockchain
details. SQLite has a native database connector with Django through
Python.

•

Ethereum Blockchain: This is the public Blockchain technology used
to provide immutable smart contracts and immutable tables. Ethereum
was chosen to extend the accessibility to EHRs at large scale, including
cases in which patients relocate to different geographic areas. In such
cases, the new geo-healthcare provider can connect to Ethereum and
request access to a patient’s EHR.

•

Microsoft (MS) Azure Files: This service is hosted on the public cloud
to store EHRs. The selection of MS Azure Files was due to its simple
accessibility and usability in addition to its independence from the
format of EHRs. MS Azure Files uses an SMB protocol to provide
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secure communication between on-premise infrastructure and the cloud
[24].
3.2 Django Architecture
This section covers the basics of Django web development architecture to
enable an understanding of the setup and configuration of the SDHCARE prototype.
Django consists of frontend and backend layers. The frontend layer consists of HTML
templates with which clients interact. The backend layer, on the other hand, gets inputs
from templates and performs the programmed function accordingly. Figure 16 shows
a block diagram of Django architecture.

Figure 16: Django Web Development Architecture
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Django simplifies HTML coding using Forms, which are Python functions
defined in forms.py file. These functions specify HTML input fields and their labels,
types, and maximum lengths, etc. (Forms do not include HTML styles and javascripts).
The actual HTML pages presented to clients are combined versions of style sheets,
javascripts, bootstraps, and other elements defined in HTML template files and with
inputs returned from forms.py.
The input values returned from the clients can be written into the database
through Models (models.py). Models act as an abstraction layer, provided by Django
and programmed using Python. They can translate Python instructions into database
queries depending on the type of integrated database. Models can receive input values
from HTML templates through Views (views.py). Additionally, Models can poll data
from the database and pre-fill Forms inputs to be presented to clients through HTML
templates (such as by dropdown selection).
Tables (tables.py) in Django are used to populate information from the
database in table format and present them to clients. This simplifies the process of
creating HTML tables compared to traditional HTML methods. Tables do not handle
styles, as this is controlled through HTML templates.
Django uses Views to link Forms, Tables, and Models with Templates. Views
control the logic of the Django web flow and how requests/responses are handled
between clients and the web application. It is at this point that SDHCARE core
functions are implemented. Additionally, Views allow the import of custom Python
models for extended functionalities that are not present in Django.
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3.3 System Implementation
This section outlines the implementation steps of the SDHCARE prototype
and covers high-level implementation. The source code for Django, Python modules,
and Ethereum smart contracts is included in the appendices.
3.3.1 Building the Runtime Environment
The first step in building the SDHCARE prototype was setting up the runtime
environment that hosts the prototype components (described in Section 3.1). These
components are independent of operating-system. MacOS Catalina was selected as the
OS hosting SDHCARE system in the healthcare provider to run Django, Python, and
SQLite, and communicate with Ethereum and MS Azure. Figure 17 shows the used
version of MacOS.

Figure 17: MacOS Software Version for SDHCARE
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The next step was to download and install Python 3.8 and PyCharm 2019.3.2
IDE. From PyCharm IDE, a new virtual environment was created to use Python 3.8 as
an interpreter for Django and custom Python modules. This was followed by creating
a new project in PyCharm called SDHCARE to run on the created virtual environment,
i.e., interpreted using Python 3.8 as shown in Figure 18.

Figure 18: PyCharm SDHCARE Project with Python 3.8 Interpreter

Following the creation of the SDHCARE project in PyCharm, a list of
required Python libraries was installed. Table 5 summarizes this list of libraries.
Python uses the PIP3 utility to install external libraries from the internet.
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Table 5: Python Libraries Required for SDHCARE
Library Name

Purpose

django

Web development framework; this installation includes
SQLite 3

django-Tables2

For formatting and styling tables in Django

crispy

For formatting and styling HTML templates in Django

web3

For API communication with Ethereum

azure-storage-file

For API communication with MS Azure

3.3.2 Initializing SDHCARE Web and Database Components
After preparing the runtime environment for hosting SDHCARE, the next step
was initializing the Django web framework and database. The initialization was done
in the following order to ensure the successful running of Django:
1. Initialize SQLite3 DB to be ready for storing the provider’s Ethereum
information and clinics’ information. This is done by running the following
commands from the PyCharm SDHCARE project terminal:
python manage.py makemigrations
python manage.py migrate
2. Create a Django admin user to administrate the Django management console,
including account creation in the Django built-in directory service. These
accounts represent doctors, nurses, officers, and receptionists. Additionally, the
admin user populates the SQLite3 database with information about the
healthcare provider’s clinics and Ethereum information. The command for
creating an admin user is:
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python manage.py createsuperuser
3. Create

SDHCARE

user

accounts

and

groups

by

navigating

to

http://localhost:8000/admin, signing in using the admin account, adding groups
for different permissions, adding new users, and assigning users to their
respective groups. Figure 19 shows a sample of users, groups, and their
assignments.

Figure 19: Example of Users, Groups, and Group Assignment
4. Create local database tables for the SDHCARE healthcare provider. These
tables are stored in the SQLite3 database with the following structures:
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•

Appointments Table: Name Column (patient name), NID, Date
Column, Time Column, and Department Column (clinic to be visited).

•

Departments Table: Code Column (clinic code) and Name Column
(clinic name).

•

Provider Table: OHP Column (Ethereum public key) and Secret
Column (Ethereum private key).

The Python code for creating these tables was written in models.py as shown
below.
class department(models.Model):
code = models.IntegerField(unique=True, primary_key=True)
name = models.CharField(max_length=100)
class provider(models.Model):
ohp = models.CharField(max_length=100, primary_key=True)
secret = models.CharField(max_length=100)
class appointment(models.Model):
name = models.CharField(max_length=100)
nid = models.IntegerField()
date = models.DateField(default=timezone.now)
time = models.TimeField(default=timezone.now)
department_code = models.ForeignKey('department',
on_delete=models.CASCADE)

5. From the Django admin console, populate departments and provider database
tables with provider’s clinics’ details and Ethereum details, respectively
(appointments database is populated by the receptionist, as described later).
Figure 20 shows the created tables from the Django admin console.
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Figure 20: Example of SDHCARE Databases

3.3.3 Building SDHCARE Django Code
After the successful initialization of Django, the next step was writing the
Django Python code to perform the required functions of the SDHCARE prototype.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this section covers only the high-level
coding structure. The low-level coding is available in the appendices.
The first step in Django coding was developing the HTML templates for the
frontend layer. The approach for HTML coding was based on developing a base
template (base.html) containing all shared components across all pages, such as
header, footer, title, and styles. Any child HTML template has page-specific
components combined with the base template, presented to the user. Figure 21
summarizes the HTML coding approach along with all the HTML templates.
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Figure 21: Summary of HTML SDHCARE Template Structure

As summarized in Figure 21, each UI has a set of specific HTML templates
that are combined with base.html before being presented to the user.
After creating the HTML templates, the next step was building the functions
in forms.py (for the input fields to be presented with each template) and associating
each form’s function with its corresponding HTML template through functions in
views.py. Figures 22, 23, and 24 provide summaries of forms.py, views.py, and the
corresponding UI.
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Figure 22: Admin UI with Forms and Views

Figure 23: Doctor UI with Forms and View
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Figure 24: Reception UI with Forms and Views
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Below is a sample of code in views.py, which links adminui-get.html with the
getProviderInfo function from forms.py. The page should display one field to the user
to enter ‘Hospital Ethereum Address’ as shown in Figure 25.
views.py
************************************************************
def adminui_get(request):
# if this is a POST request we need to process the form data
if request.method == 'POST':
# create a form instance and populate it with data from the
request:
form = getProviderInfo(request.POST)
# check whether it is valid:
if form.is_valid():
account_address = form.cleaned_data.get('OHP_Eth')
provider = dnsSC_get(account_address)
context = {
'provider': provider
}
return render(request, 'SDHCARE/adminui-get.html', context)
# if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form
else:
form = getProviderInfo()

forms.py
************************************************************
class getProviderInfo(forms.Form):
OHP_Eth = forms.CharField(label='Hospital Ethereum Address',
max_length=100)

Figure 25: Healthcare Provider’s getProviderInfo Page
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Access to each set of UIs is controlled using role-based access control (RBAC)
implemented by Python decorators. The decorator obtains the session username,
verifies its group membership (which was configured during Django initialization),
and allows access only if the user is a member of the required group. Below is a sample
code of using decorators to limit doctors’ access to Doctors UI only. These decorators
are implemented in views.py.
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='SDHCARE-Admins')
in u.groups.all())
def adminui(request):
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='SDHCARE-Admins')
in u.groups.all())
def adminui_get(request):
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='SDHCARE-Admins')
in u.groups.all())
def adminui_submit(request):

Another access control mechanism is applied to grant permissions to access
patients’ EHRs, using decorators and smart contracts. Clinics are granted permissions
to access patients’ EHRs only if the session user is a member of the SDHCAREReception group and the patient submits a valid fingerprint. A third form of access
control is applied for doctors’ access to EHRs and is covered in Section 3.3.4.
The last step in Django coding was linking models to UIs through views. In
Figures 22, 23, and 24 the set of functions in models.py are mapped to their respective
UIs to have information read from the database and displayed to clients, such as a
patient’s appointments or a provider’s OHP address, or to write information such as
booking a new appointment into the database. Some database information, such as
appointments, is formatted in tables, hence the information from models.py is passed
to views.py through tables.py. Below is a sample code for formatting appointment
data.
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tables.py
************************************************************
class appointmentTable(tables.Table):
department_code = tables.Column(verbose_name='Clinic')
#nid = tables.Column(verbose_name='National ID')
# id = tables.Column(visible=False)
id = tables.CheckBoxColumn(accessor='id')
class Meta:
model = appointment
template_name = "django_tables2/bootstrap4.html"
models.py
************************************************************
class appointment(models.Model):
name = models.CharField(max_length=100)
nid = models.IntegerField()
date = models.DateField(default=timezone.now)
time = models.TimeField(default=timezone.now)
department_code = models.ForeignKey('department',
on_delete=models.CASCADE)
def __str__(self):
return self.name
views.py
************************************************************
def receptionui_get(request):
# if this is a POST request we need to process the form data
if request.method == 'POST':
# create a form instance and populate it with data from the
request:
form = getAppointments(request.POST)
# check whether it is valid:
if form.is_valid():
nid = form.cleaned_data.get('nid')
table = appointmentTable(appointment.objects.filter(nid=nid))
return render(request, 'SDHCARE/receptionui-get.html',
{"table": table})
else:
form = getAppointments()
return render(request, 'SDHCARE/receptionui-get.html', {'form': form})

The following set of tables (Tables 6, 7, and 8) summarize the functions
configured in Views, Forms, and Tables. These functions describe how SDHCARE
design requirements are implemented in Django. The functions in Models were
described in the previous section that outlines Django SQLite3 DB initialization.
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Table 6: Summary of Views Functions
Name

Description

home
about

To render home page template to users
To render about page template to users
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Admins group
• Renders the base and adminui templates for admins
to select ‘Enter Hospital Information’ or ‘Get
Hospital Information’
• Verifies that a session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Admins group
• Reads admin OHP input and obtains the hospital
information stored in Ethereum providersTable for
that OHP; this information is returned to the admin
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Admins group
• Reads admin input (hospital name and web
address) and stores the information in Ethereum
providersTable using OHP as the indexing key;
OHP is obtained from the address of the transaction
sender
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Reception group
• Renders the base and receptionui templates for
reception to select ‘New Patient’, ‘Get Patient
Appointments’, or ‘Book New Appointment’
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Reception group
• Accepts a patient’s fingerprints and uses it as an
index key to obtain all active appointments
associated with that patient
Performs two-factor validation by verifying a patient’s
fingerprint and reception group membership; if both are
valid, the clinic is granted access to the patient’s EHRs;
this access is stored in the Ethereum patientsTable and
covers all doctors in that clinic

adminui

adminui_get

adminui_submit

receptionui

receptionui_get

appointment_confirm
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Table 6: Summary of Views Functions (Continued)
Name

Description
•

receptionui_book

new_patient

•

•
•
•

doctorui

•

•
•

doctorui_get

•

•

•
•
•
doctorui_submit
•

Verifies that the session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Reception group
Books new appointments for patients and stores
them in the appointments database, which is
indexed using the patient’s NID
Verifies that the session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Reception group
Creates a new patient record in the Ethereum
patientsTable
Verifies that the session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Doctor group
Renders the base and doctorui templates for the
doctor to select ‘Get Patient EHRs’ or ‘Submit
Patient EHRs’
Verifies that the session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Doctor group
Verifies that the doctor’s clinic is granted access to
the patient’s EHRs (using accessControlSC, which
is covered in Section 3.3.4)
Displays a list of EHRs and hashes to the doctor,
which are indexed using patients’ fingerprints
(from the Ethereum ehrHashTable); these records
are formatted in a table before being passed to
doctors
Once the doctor selects an EHR, this verifies that
the cloud EHR's hash is the same as the hash in
ehrHashTable
Retrieves the EHR from Cloudstore
Verifies that the session user is a member of the
SDHCARE-Doctor group
Verifies that the doctor’s clinic is granted access to
a patient’s EHRs using the patient’s fingerprint
(using accessControlSC, which is covered in
Section 3.3.4)
Creates an EHR based on information submitted by
a doctor; the EHR is stored in the Ethereum
ehrHashTable. A Merkle root hash is calculated for
the EHR and uploaded with the record
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Table 7: Summary of Forms Functions
Name

Description

getProviderInfo

Presents one input field to the provider’s
admin: the provider’s Ethereum address
(OHP)
Presents two input fields to the
provider’s admin: provider name and
provider web address
Presents to the receptionist the following
fields: name, fingerprint, date, time,
dropdown for the clinics
Present to the receptionist a single field:
the patient’s fingerprint
Presents to the receptionist the following
fields: name, date of birth, and
fingerprint
Presents to the doctor the following
fields: patient name, patient fingerprint,
record name, record date, and record
description
Presents to the doctor one field:
fingerprint

submitProviderInfo

bookAppointment

getAppointments
newPatient

submitRecords

getRecords

Table 8: Summary of Tables Functions
Name

Description

appointmentTable

Formats the appointments retrieved from
the local database in a table before
posting them to the receptionist
Format the EHR list retrieved from the
Ethereum ehrHashTable in a table before
posting them to the doctor

ehrTable

Figures 26 to 32 are examples of the UIs displayed to different users. These
pages represent the combined version of base.html and functional templates with some
images rendered from static fills.
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Figure 26: SDHCARE Home Page

Figure 27: SDHCARE About Page
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Figure 28: SDHCARE Login Page

Figure 29: SDHCARE Admin UI Page
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Figure 30: SDHCARE Admin UI Submit Page

Figure 31: SDHCARE-Reception UI Page
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Figure 32: SDHCARE Doctor UI Page

3.3.4 Building Ethereum Smart Contracts
The prototype for DHCARE has three smart contracts, known as dnsSC,
patientsSC, and accessControlSC, which provide the functions described in Section
2.1.3. The main reason for creating three smart contracts instead of a combined one is
to provide flexibility in extending the functionality of the SDHCARE prototype
through inheriting and importing smart contract functions.
The dnsSC has two functions:
•

createProvider: This function takes two string inputs for the healthcare
provider’s name and web address. These values are stored in the
providersTable immutable table, which is indexed by the provider’s
Ethereum address (OHP). In the case of an existing provider, the
function returns an exception error.
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•

getProvider: This function takes an address input (OHP) and returns
two string variables that represent the provider name and web address,
which are stored in providersTable.

Similar to dnsSC, accessControlSC has two functions:
•

addClinic: This function takes two string inputs representing the
patient’s fingerprint hash and the clinic ID. The clinic ID is polled from
the SQLite3 department database. Both strings are stored in an array
indexed by the patient’s fingerprint hash that represents all the clinics
that can access the patient’s EHRs. This array is part of patientsTable.

•

grantClinicAccess: This function takes two string inputs, namely the
patient’s fingerprint hash and the clinic ID. It performs a lookup in the
patientsTable, using the patient’s fingerprint hash array to determine
whether the clinicID is listed. If the clinicID is listed in the array, it
returns ‘True’, which allows the doctor to access the patient’s EHR.
Otherwise, it returns ‘False’, which denies doctor’s access.

The patientsSC includes the following four functions:
•

createPatient: This function accepts string inputs for the patient’s
fingerprint hash, provider Ethereum address, and reception ID. It stores
this information in patientsTable indexed by fingerprint hash.

•

getPatient: This function accepts a string input of the patient’s
fingerprint hash and returns the patient’s stored values in patientsTable
(i.e., provider’s address and reception ID).
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•

createEHR: This function accepts the patient’s fingerprint hash, EHR
name, date, status, and Merkle root hash. It stores the values in
ehrHashTable indexed by fingerprint hash.

•

getEHR: This function accepts a fingerprint hash input string and
returns the patient EHR list. For each EHR, the returned values are
name, date, Merkle root hash, and EHR status.

The smart contracts were deployed in Ethereum using MetaMask soft wallet,
and each contract is allocated a unique address for communication. Figure 33 is a
summary of transactions between a healthcare provider and Ethereum, including smart
contract deployments (The account of the test provider was used to deploy smart
contracts for demo purposes. In a real-life implementation, such contracts should be
deployed once by the owner of the project).
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Figure 33: Summary of Ethereum Transactions
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3.3.5 Integrating Django with Ethereum
The integration between the Django web application and Ethereum was
implemented using Web3 customized Python modules on the Django side and the
Infura mining pool on the Ethereum side. Figure 34 is a summary of the integration
between Django and Ethereum.

Figure 34: Integrating Django with Ethereum

To communicate with Ethereum Blockchain, the healthcare provider should
contribute with a dedicated mining node running Ethereum mining software (e.g., Get
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Ethereum, or GETH). A dedicated node is used to ensure patients’ privacy. For the
prototype, Infura mining pool was used, which offers mining nodes as a service to
interact with Ethereum. The free version of Infura offers 100,000 Ethereum
transactions within 24 hours. An Infura account was created, which provides a unique
URL to communicate with Infura nodes for posting and reading blocks to and from
Ethereum. Figure 35 shows the details of the Infura test account.
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Figure 35: Infura Account Details
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For Django Views to interact with Ethereum, custom Python modules were
built utilizing Web3 APIs. Each Python module has functions to interact with the
respective smart contract functions. Figure 36 summarizes the operation of the Python
modules.

Figure 36: Custom Python Module Operation
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Chapter 4: Testing and Performance Evaluation
This chapter describes the testing and evaluation of SDHCARE prototype
implementation from functional, security, and performance perspectives. Functional
testing ensured that the prototype is operating as expected by design. Security testing
validated the security measures implemented in the prototype to protect it against
unauthorized access and modifications of EHRs. Performance evaluation measured the
elapsed time required to gain read or write access to EHRs.
4.1 Functional Testing
The functional testing evaluated the SDHCARE prototype against the design
requirements discussed in previous chapters. Below is a list of evaluation metrics:
•

The system should provide a mechanism to exchange and synchronize
EHRs between distributed providers using Blockchain and the cloud
store.

•

The system should provide patients with a secure mechanism to recover
access to their EHRs.

•

The system should ensure unique mapping between patients’ identities
and their respective EHRs.

The exchange and synchronization of EHRs between distributed providers was
achieved using Ethereum public Blockchain and MS Azure Files. This was validated
by accessing the EHRs of the same patient from two SDHCARE providers using the
patient’s fingerprint (after granting access to each provider). Figure 37 shows access
results from the two SDHCARE providers.
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Figure 37: Synchronization of Patient’s EHR
To validate the access recovery mechanism for patients’ EHRs, fingerprints
hashes were used as index keys to retrieve the EHR List from ehrHashTable. Figure
38 shows the requirement to provide a fingerprint in the Doctor UI to retrieve EHRs.

Figure 38: Verifying EHR Recovery Using Patient ID
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The unique mapping between patients’ fingerprints and their EHRs was
validated by comparing the Merkle root hash values in ehrHashTable of the patient
against the files’ names stored in MS Azure Files. Figure 39 shows a sample
verification.

Figure 39: Verifying Hash as Names in Azure Files

4.2 Security Testing
The security testing of SDHCARE prototype covered the following aspects,
which were discussed in previous chapters:
•

The system should provide an access control mechanism to ensure
authorized access to EHRs.

•

The system should log all read/write activities on EHRs.

•

The system should provide anonymity of EHRs in the cloud store.

•

The system should validate the integrity of EHRs for read requests.
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The access control system in SDHCARE was implemented at multiple levels.
The first level of authorization was implemented in Django directory services to
validate the group membership of the user. This ensured that only authorized users can
access their role-specific UIs. Figure 40 shows a blocked attempt from a doctor
attempting to access Reception UI.

Figure 40: Failed Login to Reception Portal using a Doctor Account

The next level of authorization was implemented using patients’ fingerprints
to grant doctors read or write access to EHRs. Unless a valid fingerprint is submitted
by the patient, clinic doctors cannot access EHRs. Figures 41, 42, and 43 show a failed
attempt to access a patient’s EHR.
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Figure 41: Fingerprint Validation before Writing an EHR

Figure 42: Failed Attempt to Write a New EHR
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Figure 43: Failed Attempt to Read a Patient’s HER

All EHR read/write activities are logged in Ethereum Blockchain for audit
trace purposes. The log messages include a unique hash identifier, the Ethereum
address of the healthcare provider, a timestamp, and activity details. Figure 44 shows
an example from EtherScan.
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Figure 44: Sample Audit Logs for New EHR

The data stored in Azure Files were anonymized using Merkle hash values as
EHR names and suppressing patients’ PII. This ensured that patients’ identities are not
traceable from the EHR raw data. Figure 45 shows an example of anonymized data
stored in MS Azure Files from the SDHCARE prototype.
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Figure 45: Sample of Anonymized Data Store in Azure Files
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4.3 Performance Evaluation
Among all the modules in the DHCARE design, blockchain is considered the
slowest component, compared to the processing speed of the other modules. This
slowness is caused by the PoW consensus algorithm used in Ethereum. Hence it was
the focus for performance evaluation. The time delay introduced by the blockchain
layer was evaluated by validating access requests and the granting of access to EHRs.
These two components are controlled by accessControlSC smart contract and
patientsSC smart contract. To isolate the impact of copying speed of EHRs to the cloud
and obtain accurate performance measures for the blockchain, the EHR test samples
used small text files (< 20 KB). For the write test, a test patient was created and sample
EHRs written into the patient's respective ehrHashTable. For the read test, each EHR
sample stored in the ehrHashTable was read. In total, 15 samples were collected for
read and write without/with accessControlSC smart contract.
The time delay between requests and responses was measured using Google
Chrome Developer Tools. Figure 46 shows a sample time delay measurement.
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Figure 46: Performance Measurement using Google Chrome

All the evaluation test cases were executed using the same internet line to
connect to Ethereum Blockchain and Azure Files. Figures 47 and 48 summarize the
performance results.
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Figure 47: Read Performance Testing
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Figure 48: Write Performance Testing

Read performance was superior to the write performance. The average read
time was 8.81 seconds while the average write time was 16 seconds, i.e. approximately
twice the read time. This observation held with and without access control. In terms of
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today’s Internet speeds, the read and write times are considered low performance.
However, in the real-life circumstances of most healthcare environments such time
delays are acceptable. The main reason for these delays is the consensus algorithm
used by Ethereum blockchain to validate and accept blocks. Another important factor
is the load of the mining pool and its incentive to mine the block.
From the results, it can be concluded that no significant overhead delay is
added by implementing access control in Blockchain using accessControlSC smart
contract. This is because a single block includes thousands of transactions, and
transactions from both accessContractSC and paitentsSC are usually mined in a single
block (the decision to group the transactions in blocks is subject to the miner). Hence,
there is no difference between sending two transactions or one transaction as they are
mined in the same block. In one EHR sample (sample 6 in the write test with access
control), the transactions were mined in two separate blocks. Hence, the time delay for
writing the EHR metadata in ehrHashTable was 67.33 seconds.
Another important observation from Figure 49 is that the write time was
consistent and independent of the number of records in ehrHashTable, while the read
time was dependent on the number of records in ehrHashTable. In this test, five more
EHR samples were added to the test patient’s ehrHashTable (total increased to 20
samples). After re-running the read evaluation, the average read time increased from
8.81 seconds to 13.67 seconds. This is due to additional iterations executed in the code
needed to list all EHR metadata associated with the patient in ehrHashTable. Code
optimization would be required in a real-life implementation to improve the read time.
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Figure 49: Read Time Analysis with Larger ehrHashTable
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This research investigated access control recovery mechanisms for EHRs
synchronized and exchanged between distributed healthcare providers using
blockchain. The research project first reviewed the current state of research on
blockchain in healthcare to gain understanding about the active areas. This was
followed by narrowing the focus to research targeting blockchain in EHR systems.
An analysis was undertaken of current challenges in blockchain-based EHR
systems and the requirements to achieve successful access control recovery
mechanism for EHRs. Accordingly, the researcher proposed SDHCARE, a multilayer
system that splits the roles between healthcare providers, blockchain, and a cloud store.
This model system should be able to recover access to EHRs from any provider within
the blockchain network. Additionally, the model may accelerate the migration of
healthcare providers to blockchain-based systems through the availability of external
UI integration with existing legacy healthcare environments.
A prototype was built to validate the proposed approach using Django, Python,
Ethereum, and MS Azure. The prototype was coded to simulate all functional
requirements and integrate the distributed layers of the design. This was followed by
system validation and testing for functional requirements, security requirements, and
performance. The results indicated successful operation of the proposed design from a
functional and security perspective. The performance of the prototype was slow due
to the functional operation of the Ethereum blockchain. However, this latency may be
tolerable in healthcare environments.
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For future work, the researcher will evaluate SDHCARE design against hybrid
blockchain ledgers that use faster consensus algorithms. This will aim to enhance the
performance of SDHCARE for EHRs read/write while maintaining the extended
accessibility to the solution. Additionally, the prototype will be upgraded to use
advanced biometrics combining multiple fingerprints for more accuracy and privacy,
and the results should be evaluated against performance overhead. Another planned
enhancement in SDHCARE will be to introduce additional roles in access control
smart contract, including access delegation, access revocation, and record deletion.
Finally, the researcher will evaluate the use of mobile-based biometric scanning to
extend patients’ manageability of access rights to EHRs.
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Appendix
This section will cover the low-level coding of DHCARE Django and
Ethereum components.
Appendix A – Ethereum Smart Contracts
Smart Contract dnsSC
pragma solidity ^0.6.1;
contract dnsSC{
struct provider{
string name;
string webAddress;
}
mapping (address => provider) providersTable;
function createProvider (string memory _name, string memory
_webAddress) public {
address OHP = msg.sender;
providersTable[OHP] = provider (_name, _webAddress);
}
function getProvider (address _OHP) public view returns (string memory
_name, string memory _webAddress) {
_name = providersTable[_OHP].name;
_webAddress = providersTable[_OHP].webAddress;
}
}

Smart Contract patientsSC
pragma solidity ^0.6.1;
contract patientsSC{
struct patient{
string OHP;
string receptionID;
}
struct ehr{
string name;
string hash;
string status;
string date;
}
mapping (uint => patient) patientsTable;
mapping (uint => ehr[]) ehrHashTable;
function createPatient (uint _fingerprint, string memory _OHP, string
memory _receptionID) public {
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}

patientsTable[_fingerprint] = patient (_OHP, _receptionID);

function getPatient (uint _fingerprint) public view returns (string
memory _OHP, string memory _receptionID) {
_OHP = patientsTable[_fingerprint].OHP;
_receptionID = patientsTable[_fingerprint].receptionID;
}
function createEhr (uint _fingerprint, string memory _name, string
memory _hash, string memory _status, string memory _date) public {
ehrHashTable[_fingerprint].push (ehr(_name, _hash, _status,
_date));
}
function getEhr (uint _fingerprint, uint _count) public view returns
(string memory _name, string memory _hash, string memory _status, string
memory _date) {
_name = ehrHashTable[_fingerprint][_count].name;
_hash = ehrHashTable[_fingerprint][_count].hash;
_status = ehrHashTable[_fingerprint][_count].status;
_date = ehrHashTable[_fingerprint][_count].date;
}
}

Smart Contract accessControlSC
pragma solidity ^0.6.1;
contract accessControlSC{
mapping (string => string[]) PACL;
function addClinic (string memory _fingerprint, string memory
_clinicID) public {
PACL[_fingerprint].push (_clinicID);
}
function grantClinicAccess (string memory _fingerprint, string memory
_clinicID) public view returns (string memory) {
uint i;
for (i=0; i<=PACL[_fingerprint].length; i++){
if (keccak256(abi.encodePacked((PACL[_fingerprint][i]))) ==
keccak256(abi.encodePacked((_clinicID)))){
return 'true';
}
}
return 'false';
}
}

Appendix B – Ethereum Smart Contract ABIs
accessControlSC_abi.json
[

{

"inputs": [
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_fingerprint",

113
},
{

},
{

]

}

"type": "string"
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_clinicID",
"type": "string"

}
],
"name": "addClinic",
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable",
"type": "function"
"inputs": [
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_fingerprint",
"type": "string"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_clinicID",
"type": "string"
}
],
"name": "grantClinicAccess",
"outputs": [
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "",
"type": "string"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view",
"type": "function"

patientsSC_abi.json
[

{

"inputs": [
{
"internalType": "uint256",
"name": "_fingerprint",
"type": "uint256"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_name",
"type": "string"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_hash",
"type": "string"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_status",
"type": "string"
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},
{

},
{

},
{

"internalType": "string",
"name": "_date",
"type": "string"

}
],
"name": "createEhr",
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable",
"type": "function"
"inputs": [
{
"internalType": "uint256",
"name": "_fingerprint",
"type": "uint256"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_OHP",
"type": "string"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_receptionID",
"type": "string"
}
],
"name": "createPatient",
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable",
"type": "function"
"inputs": [
{
"internalType": "uint256",
"name": "_fingerprint",
"type": "uint256"
},
{
"internalType": "uint256",
"name": "_count",
"type": "uint256"
}
],
"name": "getEhr",
"outputs": [
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_name",
"type": "string"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_hash",
"type": "string"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_status",
"type": "string"
},
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{

},
{

]

}

"internalType": "string",
"name": "_date",
"type": "string"

}
],
"stateMutability": "view",
"type": "function"

"inputs": [
{
"internalType": "uint256",
"name": "_fingerprint",
"type": "uint256"
}
],
"name": "getPatient",
"outputs": [
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_OHP",
"type": "string"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_receptionID",
"type": "string"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view",
"type": "function"

dnsSC_abi.json
[

{

},
{

"inputs": [
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_name",
"type": "string"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_webAddress",
"type": "string"
}
],
"name": "createProvider",
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable",
"type": "function"
"inputs": [
{
"internalType": "address",
"name": "_OHP",
"type": "address"
}
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]

}

],
"name": "getProvider",
"outputs": [
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_name",
"type": "string"
},
{
"internalType": "string",
"name": "_webAddress",
"type": "string"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view",
"type": "function"

Appendix C – Django Main Application Code
urls.py
from
from
from
from

dhcare import views as dhcare_views
django.contrib import admin
django.contrib.auth import views as auth_views
django.urls import path, include

urlpatterns = [
path('admin/', admin.site.urls),
path('adminui/', dhcare_views.adminui, name='adminui'),
path('receptionui/', dhcare_views.receptionui, name='receptionui'),
path('receptionui-get/', dhcare_views.receptionui_get,
name='receptionui-get'),
path('receptionui-book/', dhcare_views.receptionui_book,
name='receptionui-book'),
path('appointment-confirm/', dhcare_views.appointment_confirm,
name='appointment-confirm'),
path('doctorui-get/', dhcare_views.doctorui_get, name='doctorui-get'),
path('doctorui-submit/', dhcare_views.doctorui_submit, name='doctoruisubmit'),
path('doctorui/', dhcare_views.doctorui, name='doctorui'),
path('new-patient/', dhcare_views.new_patient, name='new-patient'),
path('adminui-get/', dhcare_views.adminui_get, name='adminui_get'),
path('adminui-submit/', dhcare_views.adminui_submit,
name='adminui_submit'),
path('login/',
auth_views.LoginView.as_view(template_name='dhcare/login.html'),
name='login'),
path('logout/',
auth_views.LogoutView.as_view(template_name='dhcare/logout.html'),
name='logout'),
path('', include('dhcare.urls')),
]

settings.py
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# SECURITY WARNING: don't run with debug turned on in production!
DEBUG = True
ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']
# Application definition
INSTALLED_APPS = [
'dhcare.apps.DhcareConfig',
'crispy_forms',
'django_tables2',
'django.contrib.admin',
'django.contrib.auth',
'django.contrib.contenttypes',
'django.contrib.sessions',
'django.contrib.messages',
'django.contrib.staticfiles',
]
STATIC_URL = '/static/'
CRISPY_TEMPLATE_PACK = 'bootstrap4'
LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL = 'dhcare-home'
LOGIN_URL = 'login'

Appendix D – Django DHCARE Application Code
accessControlSC.py
import json
from web3 import Web3
def accessControlSC_add(fingerprint, clinic_id):
infura_url =
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3'
web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url))
with open('dhcare/accessControlSC_abi.json') as json_file:
accessControlSC_abi = json.load(json_file)
accessControlSC_address = '0x1b3135e3Cd2Ee573A2caC760561A15DB22ac92A3'
accessControlSC = web3.eth.contract(address=accessControlSC_address,
abi=accessControlSC_abi)
key =
'0x3E67D814F4794E3172A94C8AF582C75A6B4868F4FAC912F234E78AE97D44518A'
acct = web3.eth.account.privateKeyToAccount(key)
account_address = acct.address
try:
tx = accessControlSC.functions.addClinic(fingerprint,
clinic_id).buildTransaction(
{'nonce': web3.eth.getTransactionCount(account_address)})
signed_tx = web3.eth.account.signTransaction(tx, key)
hash = web3.eth.sendRawTransaction(signed_tx.rawTransaction)
tx_receipt=web3.eth.waitForTransactionReceipt(hash).get('transactionHash').
hex()
return ('The appointment has been confirmed and access granted to
the clinic. Your Transaction Ref. is '
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+ str(tx_receipt) + ' Please remember it for tracking
purpose')
except:
return ('Unable to Submit Information')
def accessControlSC_check(fingerprint, clinic_id):
infura_url =
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3'
web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url))
with open('dhcare/accessControlSC_abi.json') as json_file:
accessControlSC_abi = json.load(json_file)
accessControlSC_address = '0x1b3135e3Cd2Ee573A2caC760561A15DB22ac92A3'
accessControlSC = web3.eth.contract(address=accessControlSC_address,
abi=accessControlSC_abi)
try:
accessRequest =
accessControlSC.functions.grantClinicAccess(fingerprint, clinic_id).call()
return (accessRequest)
except:
return ('You are unauthorized to access or modify records for this
patient')

patientsSC.py
import json
from web3 import Web3
def patientsSC_patient_post(fingerprint, ohp, reception_id):
infura_url =
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3'
web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url))
with open('dhcare/patientsSC_abi.json') as json_file:
patientsSC_abi = json.load(json_file)
patientsSC_address = '0xD1b73bd5256a30Af32664D135618A41975f80823'
patientsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=patientsSC_address,
abi=patientsSC_abi)
key =
'0x3E67D814F4794E3172A94C8AF582C75A6B4868F4FAC912F234E78AE97D44518A'
acct = web3.eth.account.privateKeyToAccount(key)
account_address = acct.address
try:
tx = patientsSC.functions.createPatient(fingerprint, ohp,
reception_id).buildTransaction(
{'nonce': web3.eth.getTransactionCount(account_address)})
signed_tx = web3.eth.account.signTransaction(tx, key)
hash = web3.eth.sendRawTransaction(signed_tx.rawTransaction)
tx_receipt=web3.eth.waitForTransactionReceipt(hash).get('transactionHash').
hex()
return ('Patient File was Created Successfully! Transaction Ref. '
+ str(tx_receipt))
except:
return ('Unable to Submit Information')
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def patientsSC_ehr_post(fingerprint, name, hash, status, date):
infura_url =
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3'
web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url))
with open('dhcare/patientsSC_abi.json') as json_file:
patientsSC_abi = json.load(json_file)
patientsSC_address = '0xD1b73bd5256a30Af32664D135618A41975f80823'
patientsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=patientsSC_address,
abi=patientsSC_abi)
key =
'0x3E67D814F4794E3172A94C8AF582C75A6B4868F4FAC912F234E78AE97D44518A'
acct = web3.eth.account.privateKeyToAccount(key)
account_address = acct.address
try:
tx = patientsSC.functions.createEhr(fingerprint, name, hash,
status, date).buildTransaction(
{'nonce': web3.eth.getTransactionCount(account_address)})
signed_tx = web3.eth.account.signTransaction(tx, key)
hash = web3.eth.sendRawTransaction(signed_tx.rawTransaction)
tx_receipt=web3.eth.waitForTransactionReceipt(hash).get('transactionHash').
hex()
return ('Patient Records Uploaded Sucessfully! Transaction Ref. ' +
str(tx_receipt))
except:
return ('Unable to Upload Reocrds')
def patientsSC_ehr_get(fingerprint):
infura_url =
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3'
web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url))
with open('dhcare/patientsSC_abi.json') as json_file:
patientsSC_abi = json.load(json_file)
patientsSC_address = '0xD1b73bd5256a30Af32664D135618A41975f80823'
patientsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=patientsSC_address,
abi=patientsSC_abi)
try:
count = 0
getEhr = patientsSC.functions.getEhr(fingerprint, count).call()
output = [{'id':count, 'record_name':getEhr[0],
'record_hash':getEhr[1], 'record_status':getEhr[2],
'record_date':getEhr[3]}]
while True:
try:
count = count + 1
getEhr = patientsSC.functions.getEhr(fingerprint,
count).call()
output.append({'id':count, 'record_name':getEhr[0],
'record_hash':getEhr[1], 'record_status':getEhr[2],
'record_date':getEhr[3]})
except:
return (output)
except:
return ('Unable to Retrieve Information')
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dnsSC.py
import json
from web3 import Web3
def dnsSC_get(account_address):
infura_url =
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3'
web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url))
with open('dhcare/dnsSC_abi.json') as json_file:
dnsSC_abi = json.load(json_file)
dnsSC_address = '0x274D835998CDb077C224531619eB6e4D86b7739d'
dnsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=dnsSC_address, abi=dnsSC_abi)
try:
getProvider = dnsSC.functions.getProvider(account_address).call()
provider = {'provider_name': getProvider[0], 'provider_webAddress':
getProvider[1]}
return (provider)
except:
return ('Unable to Retrieve Information')
def dnsSC_post(name, webAddress):
infura_url =
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3'
web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url))
with open('dhcare/dnsSC_abi.json') as json_file:
dnsSC_abi = json.load(json_file)
dnsSC_address = '0x274D835998CDb077C224531619eB6e4D86b7739d'
dnsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=dnsSC_address, abi=dnsSC_abi)
key =
'0x3E67D814F4794E3172A94C8AF582C75A6B4868F4FAC912F234E78AE97D44518A'
acct = web3.eth.account.privateKeyToAccount(key)
account_address = acct.address
try:
tx = dnsSC.functions.createProvider(name,
webAddress).buildTransaction(
{'nonce': web3.eth.getTransactionCount(account_address)})
signed_tx = web3.eth.account.signTransaction(tx, key)
hash = web3.eth.sendRawTransaction(signed_tx.rawTransaction)
tx_receipt=web3.eth.waitForTransactionReceipt(hash).get('transactionHash').
hex()
return ('Information was Submitted Successfully! Transaction Ref. '
+ str(tx_receipt))
except:
return ('Unable to Submit Information')

admin.py
from django.contrib import admin
from django.contrib.auth.admin import UserAdmin
from django.contrib.auth.models import User
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from .models import provider, department, appointment, Profile
class ProfileInline(admin.StackedInline):
model = Profile
can_delete = False
verbose_name_plural = 'Profile'
fk_name = 'user'
class CustomUserAdmin(UserAdmin):
inlines = (ProfileInline, )
def get_inline_instances(self, request, obj=None):
if not obj:
return list()
return super(CustomUserAdmin, self).get_inline_instances(request,
obj)
admin.site.register(provider)
admin.site.register(department)
admin.site.register(appointment)
admin.site.unregister(User)
admin.site.register(User, CustomUserAdmin)

apps.py
from django.apps import AppConfig
class DhcareConfig(AppConfig):
name = 'dhcare'

azure_files.py
from azure.storage.file import FileService
from azure.storage.file import ContentSettings
file_service = FileService(account_name='dhcarestorage',
account_key='ArdixcQfhaAfmwC9XueTPaJYXEDXa3CXlXoYZ7Z76GigvDWJz4WDDqmxQtB61q
IPk+4rr+r71WXEZQX8OruIsQ==')
# file_service.create_share('dhcare')
# def get_file():
#
name = ''
#
value = ''
#
file_service.get_file_to_text('dhcare', None, name, encoding='utf-8')
#
return (name)
def create_ehr(name, value):
file_service.create_file_from_text(
'dhcare',
None, # We want to create this blob in the root directory, so we
specify None for the directory_name
name,
value,
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encoding = 'utf-8',
content_settings = ContentSettings(content_type='txt'))

custom_decorators.py
from functools import wraps
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from
from
from
from

django.conf import settings
django.contrib import messages
django.contrib.auth import REDIRECT_FIELD_NAME
django.shortcuts import resolve_url

def custom_user_passes_test(test_func, login_url=None,
redirect_field_name=REDIRECT_FIELD_NAME):
"""
Decorator for views that checks that the user passes the given test,
redirecting to the log-in page if necessary. The test should be a
callable
that takes the user object and returns True if the user passes.
"""
def decorator(view_func):
@wraps(view_func)
def _wrapped_view(request, *args, **kwargs):
if test_func(request.user):
return view_func(request, *args, **kwargs)
path = request.build_absolute_uri()
resolved_login_url = resolve_url(login_url or
settings.LOGIN_URL)
# If the login url is the same scheme and net location then
just
# use the path as the "next" url.
login_scheme, login_netloc = urlparse(resolved_login_url)[:2]
current_scheme, current_netloc = urlparse(path)[:2]
if ((not login_scheme or login_scheme == current_scheme) and
(not login_netloc or login_netloc == current_netloc)):
path = request.get_full_path()
from django.contrib.auth.views import redirect_to_login
messages.warning(request, 'Unauthorized Access! You need to
login successfully')
return redirect_to_login(
path, resolved_login_url, redirect_field_name)
return _wrapped_view
return decorator

forms.py
from django import forms
from .models import appointment
# By default DateInput takes input as string. Using this class, we can
change the input as Calender
class DateInput(forms.DateInput):
input_type = 'date'
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class TimeInput(forms.TimeInput):
input_type = 'time'
class getProviderInfo(forms.Form):
OHP_Eth = forms.CharField(label='Hospital Ethereum Address',
max_length=100)
class submitProviderInfo(forms.Form):
name = forms.CharField(label='Hospital Name', max_length=100)
webAddress = forms.CharField(label='Hospital Web Address',
max_length=100)
class bookAppointment(forms.ModelForm):
class Meta:
model = appointment
fields = ['name', 'nid', 'date', 'time', 'department_code']
labels = {
'name': 'Patient Name',
'nid': 'National ID',
'date': 'Date',
'time': 'Time',
'department_code': 'Clinic'
}
widgets = {'date': DateInput(), 'time': TimeInput()}
class getAppointments(forms.Form):
nid = forms.IntegerField(label='Patient National ID')
class newPatient(forms.Form):
name = forms.CharField(label='Patient Name', max_length=100)
dob = forms.DateField(label='Date of Birth', widget=DateInput)
fingerprint = forms.CharField(label='Fingerprint', max_length=100)
class submitRecords(forms.Form):
patient_name = forms.CharField(label='Patient Name', max_length=100)
patient_fingerprint = forms.CharField(label='Fingerprint',
max_length=100)
record_name = forms.CharField(label='Record Name', max_length=100)
record_date = forms.DateField(label='Date', widget=DateInput)
record_description = forms.CharField(label='Records',
widget=forms.Textarea)
class getRecords(forms.Form):
patient_fingerprint = forms.CharField(label='Patient Fingerprint',
max_length=100)

models.py
from
from
from
from
from

django.db import models
django.utils import timezone
django.contrib.auth.models import User
django.db.models.signals import post_save
django.dispatch import receiver

class department(models.Model):
code = models.IntegerField(unique=True, primary_key=True)
name = models.CharField(max_length=100)
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# This is required to show the name attribute of the database instead
of 'department object (code)'
# in the drop-down
def __str__(self):
return self.name
class provider(models.Model):
ohp = models.CharField(max_length=100, primary_key=True)
secret = models.CharField(max_length=100)
def __str__(self):
return self.ohp
class appointment(models.Model):
name = models.CharField(max_length=100)
nid = models.IntegerField()
date = models.DateField(default=timezone.now)
time = models.TimeField(default=timezone.now)
# This is better than 'CHOICES' because 'CHOICES' need static values
for the drop-down but this is
# polled from the database department
department_code = models.ForeignKey('department',
on_delete=models.CASCADE)
def __str__(self):
return self.name
class Profile(models.Model):
user = models.OneToOneField(User, on_delete=models.CASCADE)
department_code = models.ForeignKey('department',
on_delete=models.CASCADE, blank=True)
@receiver(post_save, sender=User)
def create_or_update_user_profile(sender, instance, created, **kwargs):
if created:
Profile.objects.create(user=instance)
instance.profile.save()

tables.py
import django_tables2 as tables
from .models import appointment
class appointmentTable(tables.Table):
department_code = tables.Column(verbose_name='Clinic')
#nid = tables.Column(verbose_name='National ID')
# id = tables.Column(visible=False)
id = tables.CheckBoxColumn(accessor='id')
class Meta:
model = appointment
template_name = "django_tables2/bootstrap4.html"
class ehrTable(tables.Table):
id = tables.CheckBoxColumn(accessor='id')
record_name = tables.Column(verbose_name='Record Name',
order_by='name')
record_date = tables.Column(verbose_name='Record Date')
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record_hash = tables.Column(verbose_name=' Record Hash')
record_status = tables.Column(verbose_name='Record Status')
class Meta:
template_name = "django_tables2/bootstrap4.html"

urls.py
from django.urls import path
from . import views
urlpatterns = [
path('', views.home, name='dhcare-home'),
path('about/', views.about, name='dhcare-about'),
]

views.py
import hashlib
from django.contrib import messages
from django.contrib.auth.models import Group
from django.shortcuts import render
from django.contrib.auth.models import User
from .accessControlSC import accessControlSC_add, accessControlSC_check
from .custom_decorators import custom_user_passes_test
from .dnsSC import dnsSC_get, dnsSC_post
from .forms import getProviderInfo, submitProviderInfo, getAppointments,
getRecords
from .forms import submitRecords, bookAppointment, newPatient
from .models import appointment, provider, department
from .patientsSC import patientsSC_patient_post, patientsSC_ehr_post,
patientsSC_ehr_get
from .tables import appointmentTable, ehrTable
from django_tables2 import RequestConfig
from .azure_files import create_ehr
def home(request):
return render(request, 'dhcare/home.html')
def about(request):
return render(request, 'dhcare/about.html', {'title': 'About'})
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Admins')
in u.groups.all())
def adminui(request):
return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui.html')
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Admins')
in u.groups.all())
def adminui_get(request):
# if this is a POST request we need to process the form data
if request.method == 'POST':
# create a form instance and populate it with data from the
request:
form = getProviderInfo(request.POST)
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# check whether it's valid:
if form.is_valid():
account_address = form.cleaned_data.get('OHP_Eth')
provider = dnsSC_get(account_address)
context = {
'provider': provider
}
return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui-get.html', context)
# if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form
else:
form = getProviderInfo()
return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui-get.html', {'form': form})
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Admins')
in u.groups.all())
def adminui_submit(request):
# if this is a POST request we need to process the form data
if request.method == 'POST':
# create a form instance and populate it with data from the
request:
form = submitProviderInfo(request.POST)
# check whether it's valid:
if form.is_valid():
providerTx = dnsSC_post(form.cleaned_data.get('name'),
form.cleaned_data.get('webAddress'))
context = {
'providerTx': providerTx
}
return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui-submit.html', context)
# if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form
else:
form = submitProviderInfo()
return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui-submit.html', {'form': form})
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCAREReception') in u.groups.all())
def receptionui(request):
return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui.html')
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCAREReception') in u.groups.all())
def receptionui_get(request):
# if this is a POST request we need to process the form data
if request.method == 'POST':
# create a form instance and populate it with data from the
request:
form = getAppointments(request.POST)
# check whether it's valid:
if form.is_valid():
nid = form.cleaned_data.get('nid')
table = appointmentTable(appointment.objects.filter(nid=nid))
return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui-get.html', {"table":
table})
else:
form = getAppointments()
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return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui-get.html', {'form': form})
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCAREReception') in u.groups.all())
def new_patient(request):
# if this is a POST request we need to process the form data
if request.method == 'POST':
# create a form instance and populate it with data from the
request:
form = newPatient(request.POST)
# check whether it's valid:
if form.is_valid():
provider_db = provider.objects.all()
for item in provider_db:
ohp = str(item.ohp)
reception_db = department.objects.filter(name='Reception')
for item in reception_db:
reception_id = str(item.code)
name = form.cleaned_data.get('name')
dob = form.cleaned_data.get('dob')
fingerprint = form.cleaned_data.get('fingerprint')
confirmation = patientsSC_patient_post(int(fingerprint), name,
str(dob), ohp, reception_id)
return render(request, 'dhcare/new-patient.html',
{'confirmation': confirmation})
# if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form
else:
form = newPatient()
return render(request, 'dhcare/new-patient.html', {'form': form})
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCAREReception') in u.groups.all())
def receptionui_book(request):
# if this is a POST request we need to process the form data
if request.method == 'POST':
# create a form instance and populate it with data from the
request:
form = bookAppointment(request.POST)
# check whether it's valid:
if form.is_valid():
form.save()
patient_name = form.cleaned_data.get('name')
messages.success(request, 'Appointment Booking Confirmed for
Patient Name {}'.format(patient_name))
return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui.html')
# if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form
else:
form = bookAppointment()
return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui-book.html', {'form': form})
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCAREReception') in u.groups.all())
def appointment_confirm(request):
if request.method == 'POST':
checkbox_id = request.POST.get('id')
checkbox_table = appointment.objects.filter(id=checkbox_id)
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for item in checkbox_table:
fingerprint = str(item.fingerprint)
department_code = str(item.department_code)
accessControlSC_tx = accessControlSC_add(fingerprint,
department_code)
appointment.objects.filter(id=checkbox_id).delete()
return render(request, 'dhcare/appointments.html',
{"accessControlSC_tx": accessControlSC_tx})
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Doctors')
in u.groups.all())
def doctorui(request):
return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui.html')
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Doctors')
in u.groups.all())
def doctorui_get(request):
# if this is a POST request we need to process the form data
if request.method == 'POST':
# create a form instance and populate it with data from the
request:
form = getRecords(request.POST)
# check whether it's valid:
if form.is_valid():
fingerprint = form.cleaned_data.get("patient_fingerprint")
user = User.objects.get(username=request.user)
clinic_id = user.profile.department_code
accessRequest = accessControlSC_check(str(fingerprint),
str(clinic_id))
if accessRequest is True:
getEHR = patientsSC_ehr_get(int(fingerprint))
table = ehrTable(getEHR)
RequestConfig(request).configure(table)
return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-get.html',
{'getEHR':table})
else:
return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-get.html',
{'error': accessRequest})
# if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form
else:
form = getRecords()
return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-get.html', {"form": form})
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Doctors')
in u.groups.all())
def doctorui_submit(request):
# if this is a POST request we need to process the form data
if request.method == 'POST':
# create a form instance and populate it with data from the
request:
form = submitRecords(request.POST)
# check whether it's valid:
if form.is_valid():
fingerprint = form.cleaned_data.get('patient_fingerprint')
user = User.objects.get(username=request.user)
clinic_id = user.profile.department_code
accessRequest = accessControlSC_check(str(fingerprint),
str(clinic_id))
if accessRequest is True:
name = form.cleaned_data.get('record_name')
description = form.cleaned_data.get('record_description')
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date = str(form.cleaned_data.get('record_date'))
status = 'Active'
sha256_name =
str(hashlib.sha256(name.encode()).hexdigest())
sha256_description =
str(hashlib.sha256(description.encode()).hexdigest())
H1 = sha256_name + sha256_description
sha256_date =
str(hashlib.sha256(date.encode()).hexdigest())
sha256_status =
str(hashlib.sha256(str(status).encode()).hexdigest())
H2 = sha256_date + sha256_status
H3 = str(hashlib.sha256(str(H1).encode()).hexdigest()) +
str(hashlib.sha256(str(H2).encode()).hexdigest())
sha256 = str(hashlib.sha256(H3.encode()).hexdigest())
createEHR = patientsSC_ehr_post(int(fingerprint), name,
sha256, status, date)
create_ehr(sha256, description)
return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-submit.html',
{'createEHR': createEHR})
else:
return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-submit.html',
{'createEHR': accessRequest})
# if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form
else:
form = submitRecords()
return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-submit.html', {"form": form})

Appendix E – Django HTML Templates
about.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% block content %}
<h1>About Page</h1>
<div class="w3-container">
<p style="font-family: 'Raleway',sans-serif; font-size: 18px; fontweight: 500; line-height: 32px; margin: 0 0 24px; text-align: justify;
text-justify: inter-word; "><br>
DHCARE is Blockchain-Based Healthcare System that utilizes
fingprints to identify patients and synchronize their
Electoric Healthcare Records (EHRs) between distributed
healthcare providers.
<br><br>
The main features provided by DHCARE are:
<div style="font-family: 'Raleway',sans-serif; font-size: 18px;
font-weight: 500; line-height: 32px; margin: 0 0 24px; text-align: justify;
text-justify: inter-word; ">
<ul>
<li>Exchange and synchronization of EHRs between
distributed healthcare providers</li>
<li>Maintaining EHRs unique patients' identity</li>
<li>Ensuring recoverable access to patients’ EHRs</li>
<li>Implementing role-based access control to EHRs</li>
<li>Providing anonymity to patients’ EHRs in the cloud
datastores</li>
<li>Detecting unauthorized modifications to EHRs</li>
<li>Audit logging any activities on EHRs</li>
</ul>
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</div>
</p>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

adminui.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% load static %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Admin Portal</legend>
</fieldset>
<img src="{% static 'dhcare/admin.jpg' %}" class="home-img"
alt="Logo" width="100%"><br><br>
<div class="form-group">
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url
'adminui_get' %}" type="submit">Get Hospital
Information
</button>
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url
'adminui_submit' %}" type="submit">Submit Hospital
Information
</button>
</div>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

adminui-get.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Hospital
Information</legend>
{{ form|crispy }}
{% if provider.provider_name %}
<div class="text-dark">
<b> Hospital Name: </b>{{provider.provider_name}}<br><br>
<b> Hospital Web Address:
</b>{{provider.provider_webAddress}}<br><br>
</div>
{% else %}
<div class="text-danger">
{{provider}}
</div>
{% endif %}
</fieldset>
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Get
Info</button>
</form>
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</div>
{% endblock content %}

adminui-submit.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Hospital
Information</legend>
{{ form|crispy }}
{% if providerTx %}
<div class="text-dark">
<b> {{providerTx}} </b><br><br>
</div>
{% else %}
<div class="text-danger">
{{providerTx}}
</div>
{% endif %}
</fieldset>
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Submit
Info</button>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

appointments.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Appointment
Confirmed</legend>
{{accessControlSC_tx}}
</fieldset>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

base.html
{% load static %}
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<!-- Required meta tags -->
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, shrink-to-fit=no"
name="viewport">
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<!-- Bootstrap CSS -->
<link crossorigin="anonymous"
href="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/css/bootstrap.min.css
"
<link crossorigin="anonymous"
href="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/css/bootstrap.min.css
"
integrity="sha384Gn5384xqQ1aoWXA+058RXPxPg6fy4IWvTNh0E263XmFcJlSAwiGgFAW/dAiS6JXm"
rel="stylesheet">
<link href="{% static 'dhcare/main.css' %}" rel="stylesheet"
type="text/css">
{% if title %}
<title>DHCARE - {{ title }}</title>
{% else %}
<title>DHCARE</title>
{% endif %}
</head>
<body>
<header class="site-header">
<nav class="navbar navbar-expand-md navbar-dark bg-steel fixed-top">
<div class="container">
<a class="navbar-brand mr-4" href="{% url 'dhcare-home'
%}">DHCARE</a>
<button aria-controls="navbarToggle" aria-expanded="false"
aria-label="Toggle navigation"
class="navbar-toggler" data-target="#navbarToggle"
data-toggle="collapse" type="button">
<span class="navbar-toggler-icon"></span>
</button>
<div class="collapse navbar-collapse" id="navbarToggle">
<div class="navbar-nav mr-auto">
<a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'dhcare-home'
%}">Home</a>
<a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'dhcareabout' %}">About</a>
</div>
<!-- Navbar Right Side -->
<div class="navbar-nav">
{% if user.is_authenticated %}
<a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'logout'
%}">Logout</a>
{% if 'DHCARE-Admins' in user.groups.all.0.name %}
<a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'adminui'
%}">Admin</a>
{% endif %}
{% if 'DHCARE-Doctors' in user.groups.all.0.name %}
<a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'doctorui'
%}">Doctor</a>
{% endif %}
{% if 'DHCARE-Reception' in user.groups.all.0.name %}
<a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'receptionui'
%}">Appointments</a>
{% endif %}
{% else %}
<a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'login'
%}">Login</a>
{% endif %}
</div>
</div>
</div>
</nav>
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</header>
<main class="container" role="main">
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-8">
{% if messages %}
{% for message in messages %}
<div class="alert alert-{{ message.tags }}">
{{ message }}
</div>
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
{% block content %}{% endblock %}
</div>
</div>
</main>
<!-- Optional JavaScript -->
<!-- jQuery first, then Popper.js, then Bootstrap JS -->
<script crossorigin="anonymous" integrity="sha384KJ3o2DKtIkvYIK3UENzmM7KCkRr/rE9/Qpg6aAZGJwFDMVNA/GpGFF93hXpG5KkN"
src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.2.1.slim.min.js"></script>
<script crossorigin="anonymous" integrity="sha384ApNbgh9B+Y1QKtv3Rn7W3mgPxhU9K/ScQsAP7hUibX39j7fakFPskvXusvfa0b4Q"
src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/popper.js/1.12.9/umd/popper.min
.js"></script>
<script crossorigin="anonymous" integrity="sha384JZR6Spejh4U02d8jOt6vLEHfe/JQGiRRSQQxSfFWpi1MquVdAyjUar5+76PVCmYl"
src="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/js/bootstrap.min.js"><
/script>
</body>
</html>

doctorui.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% load static %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Doctor Portal</legend>
</fieldset>
<img src="{% static 'dhcare/doctor.jpg' %}" class="home-img"
alt="Logo" width="100%"><br><br>
<div class="form-group">
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url
'doctorui-get' %}" type="submit">Get Patient Records
</button>
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url
'doctorui-submit' %}" type="submit">Submit Patient
Records
</button>
</div>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}
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doctorui-get.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% load django_tables2 %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section" style="width:150%">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Patient Records</legend>
{{form|crispy}}
{% if getEHR %}
{% render_table getEHR %}
<div class="form-group">
</div>
{% else %}
{{error}}
{% endif %}
<br><button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Get
Records</button>
</fieldset>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

doctorui-submit.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Doctor Portal</legend>
{{form|crispy}}
{% if createEHR %}
{{createEHR}}
{% else %}
<button class="btn btn-outline-info"
type="submit">Submit</button>
{% endif %}
</fieldset>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

home.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load static %}
{% block content %}
<h1 style="width:150%; color: #666; font-family: 'Consolas',sans-serif;
font-size: 60px; font-weight: 800; line-height: 72px; margin: 0 0 10px;
text-align: center; text-transform: uppercase;">
DHCARE
</h1>
<h2 style="width:150%; color: #987; font-family: 'Calibri',sans-serif;
font-size: 30px; font-weight: 200; line-height: 5px; margin: 0 0 60px;
text-align: center; text-transform: uppercase;">
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Biometric Distributed Healthcare System on Blockchain
</h2>
<img src="{% static 'dhcare/home.jpg' %}" class="home-img" alt="Logo"
width="150%"><br><br><br>
{% endblock content %}

login.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Log In</legend>
{{ form|crispy }}
</fieldset>
<div class="form-group">
<button class="btn btn-outline-info"
type="submit">Login</button>
</div>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

logou.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% block content %}
<h2>You have been logged out</h2>
<div class="border-top pt-3">
<small class="text-muted">
<a href="{% url 'login' %}">Log In Again</a>
</small>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

new-patient.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Add Patient</legend>
{{ form|crispy }}
{% if confirmation %}
{{ confirmation}}
{% else %}
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Add</button>
{% endif %}
</fieldset>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}
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receptionui.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% load static %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Reception Portal</legend>
</fieldset>
<img src="{% static 'dhcare/reception.jpg' %}" class="home-img"
alt="Logo" width="100%"><br><br>
<div class="form-group">
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url 'newpatient' %}" type="submit">Add New Patient
</button>
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url
'receptionui-get' %}" type="submit">Get Patient
Appointments
</button>
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url
'receptionui-book' %}" type="submit">Book New
Appointment
</button>
</div>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

receptionui-book.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Appointment Booking</legend>
{{ form|crispy }}
</fieldset>
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Book</button>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}

receptionui-get.html
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %}
{% load crispy_forms_tags %}
{% load django_tables2 %}
{% block content %}
<div class="content-section">
<form method="POST">
{% csrf_token %}
<fieldset class="form-group">
<legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Patient
Appointments</legend>
{{ form|crispy }}
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{% if table %}
{% render_table table %}
<button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url
'appointment-confirm' %}" type="submit">Confirm
</button>
{% else %}
<button class="btn btn-outline-info"
type="submit">Get</button>
{% endif %}
</fieldset>
</form>
</div>
{% endblock content %}
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